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 1 
Introduction 
  
From unfathomable acts of terrorism, to natural disasters, to popular uprisings, the past 
decade has seen democratic nations placed in precarious situations that at times threaten the very 
underpinnings of governmental processes, societies, and economies.  Unprecedentedly rapid 
globalization of the planet has certainly exacerbated this situation, in which information cannot 
be contained (outside of China and in countries like Libya where, in the midst of a political and 
civil meltdown, Cisco has reported a complete halt in Internet traffic moving in and out of 
Libyan territory). 
Even fairly open societies like the U.S. and Great Britain have not been immune to such 
threatening situations.  Perhaps because the ideological democracy that underpins bastions of 
freedom like the U.S. and the UK promotes citizens’ abilities to denounce government, take 
issue with its policies, and exercise their opinions at the ballot box, these countries may be said 
to be in more difficult positions than countries like China and Libya with regard to situations that 
would threaten governmental instability.  Though more stable than governments that can simply 
turn off civil rights and freedoms whenever they feel the need, there is consequently a greater 
need to be responsible, to maintain a level of accountability, and to perpetuate trust in 
government. 
To be sure, these are quite vague notions.  Nevertheless, severe crisis situations have 
rattled both countries in recent years and called public confidence into question.  In the U.S., the 
2008 economic meltdown exposed a significant amount of greed in America’s private sector 
while also calling into question Congress’ ability to govern.  Striking to the heart of much of the 
ideological difference between Democrats and Republicans, the policy response to economic 
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issues exposed much of the deadlock in Washington, against which so many politicians 
campaign on a platform denouncing ‘politics as usual’ and a Washington described as 
fundamentally ‘broken.’  The Democrats are all for taking more control, passing stimulus 
budgets that pump more money into the economy with stricter federal government regulation of 
the financial sector.  The Republicans are all for laissez-faire economics combined with reduced 
federal government powers, giving power back to businesses and individuals to initiate an 
economic trickle-down effect.  Putting aside political biases and points of view that lead 
Americans to argue opinion as if it were fact (no one is innocent of this), on a purely ideological 
level these differences are valid; there is no absolute right or wrong. 
What is problematic about these differences is that legislators so steadfastly believe their 
opinions to be right and their opponents’ wrong that they will oppose all efforts from across the 
aisle that would pass into law a plan ideologically out of step with their beliefs.  The American 
system of governance enables such gridlock: a system predisposed to status quo (and for good 
reason), it allows as few as one legislator in the minority party to block legislation or as little as 
the president’s refusal to sign a bill to stymie a year’s worth of legislative effort.  In response, the 
mechanism to overturn blocked legislation requires such a level of agreement as to make it 
increasingly difficult to achieve.  Compromise then becomes the word of the day: compromise 
between legislators to get something done, and compromised legislation that results. 
The UK has also faced many significant crises, oftentimes of the same nature as those 
that have taken their toll on America.  From concern over effectiveness of the National Health 
Service—the UK’s socialized and nationalized health system—to economic woes following the 
2008 global economic downturn, the British legislature has had to respond to significant 
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problems, with citizens looking to Parliament for answers and expecting answers of the world-
class caliber that the Westminster government is supposed to provide. 
Though the crises affecting cousins across the pond are oftentimes similar, the legislative 
and policy responses are quite different.  As the Brits look to tighten their belt, making cuts to 
public services and increasing taxes, the U.S. chooses to extend the Bush tax cuts that were 
expected to sunset at the end of 2010.  Those familiar with the parliamentary style of legislating 
(which from an outside perspective seems inordinately complex—perhaps the only thing more 
difficult for an American to understand than the Westminster government and the electoral 
process that enables it is Cockney rhyme slang: check Wikipedia to find out what the phrase ‘to 
tell a porkie’ has to with telling a lie) will not be surprised by such a distinction.  The disparity 
lies buried beneath the greatest difference between the Westminster parliamentary model and the 
American presidential model: where the U.S. system is status quo based, the party in power in 
the UK can, with limits, pass through whatever legislation it likes, regardless of the dismay that 
legislation may cause to minority parties in opposition. 
This distinction underscores a longstanding dialogue within American Political Science 
in an attempt to address why the American government is so unable to respond with policy, 
either in normal or extreme circumstances.  Much brainpower has been expended by the likes of 
significant political scientists to come to the conclusion that the fault is not cultural but 
structural.  The notion that Washington is broken is a recent one, yet at every significant point in 
American politics over the past fifty years there has been an outcry that the American system of 
government is ineffective.  Outcries have existed in spite of the fact that the degree of inter-party 
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animosity in D.C. has not always been so—indeed animosity has increased steadily over time.1 
Nonetheless, there is significant muscle behind the structural argument: the American 
government’s inability to ‘get things done,’ both in times of normalcy and crisis, is the legacy of 
a unique system of checks and balances, separation of powers, and constitutional provisions that, 
by design, make change hard to come by. 
Critics such as James Sundquist (via the Brookings Institute), David Samuels of the 
University of Minnesota, and Matthew Shugart of UCSD take a keen interest in the Westminster 
model’s fluidity of response and relative ease of enacting legislation.  Sundquist argues for 
constitutional and structural changes to enable a parliamentary system, and Samuels and Shugart 
scrutinize the virtues and vices of presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems (the 
virtues heavily on the side of the parliamentary model as they discuss the inherent inferiority of 
presidential and semi-presidential systems).  Acknowledging that an overall switch to a 
parliamentary model—if America even desired to adopt such a system, which it does not—will 
not happen, they nevertheless highlight several areas upon which the U.S. could evolve and 
improve.  At least as far as Sundquist is concerned, those reforms are straight out of the 
parliamentary model textbook. 
Their respective arguments, interesting as they may be, lack the credibility to be 
considered seriously.  The analysis is topical; if America is the tortoise, Britain is the hare.  The 
tortoise moves too slowly.  Therefore, the hare is what we need.  On the surface, and in 
comparison to the tortoise, the hare may appear perfectly suited to solve the problem, but the 
argument does not dissect the hare to discover any innate issues residing underneath the surface 
that may make the hare undesirable. 
                                                
1 For more on inter-party animosity, a colleague has addressed the diminution of collegiality among Members of 
Congress.  See Evan Philipson’s “Bringing Down the House: The Causes and Effects of the Decline of Personal 
Relationships in the U.S. House of Representatives.”  Available online via CUREJ. 
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Just as the U.S. has experienced serious challenges to its system of government in even 
the past presidential term, so too have there been catastrophic events in and around Westminster 
in recent years.  Looking as recently as two years back, this treatise looks to the constitutional 
reform effort and package that was put forth in 2009 in response to a devastating scandal 
whereby it was revealed that dishonesty and cheating ran rampant among the expense accounts 
of members of the House of Commons.  Secondly, this research looks at the currently evolving 
British response to the 2008 financial downturn, which is taking shape in a hard-hitting austerity 
plan of cutbacks in public services and tax increases codenamed “The Big Society” and from 
which few Britons can escape completely. The current Coalition government has pushed through 
benefit cuts and tax increases through a more or less across the board 19% budget cut to 
government departments, and an increase in the VAT to 20% effective January 4th, 2011 (VAT 
had been temporarily set at 15% from December 2008, returning to 17.5% in January 2010).1 
There is no argument to be made here with regard to which system is patently superior.  
They are both flawed (oftentimes for different, but sometimes for the same, reasons); that 
Sundquist, Samuels and Shugart nevertheless believe the Westminster model is superior damages 
their arguments from the outset.  Pros and cons abound in both, and upon inspection the oft-
referred to Churchill quote that ‘democracy is the worst form of government… except for all the 
rest’ comes to mind.  Rather, the following pages serve to understand and question the way that 
Parliament has dealt with stressful situations.  The more its method of response and the remedies 
on which it has settled are examined, the clearer it becomes that the UK is not necessarily the 
best place to turn to deal with American procedural woes.  Though the comparison between the 
                                                
1 Unknown.  “HM Revenue & Customs: Accounting for VAT When the Standard Rate of VAT Returned to 17.5 Per 
Cent.”  hmrc.gov.uk.  HM Revenue & Customs, n.d. Web. 1 March 2011. <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/vat/forms-
rates/rates/rate-changes.htm>. 
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U.S. and the UK does not vet all the possible governmental models, the evidence against using 
parliamentary reform to solve stateside issues is strong enough to question whether in fact we 
should be turning to other governments to look for how to amend our own.   
The following essay will argue that instead of continuing to suggest that the U.S. 
government is inherently flawed and inferior to other governmental models, analysis of the 
American system must recognize that its system presents unique challenges like any other.  The 
essay is comprised of extensive archival research and field research conducted in London.  By 
spending time in and around Westminster and interviewing politicians, economists, journalists, 
and academics, this work attempts to back up the opinions here presented with a complete and 
differentiated suite of expert analysis.  Ultimately, the conclusion is that instead of searching for 
a way to abandon the American system of government, the time and energy of America’s 
political scientists would be better spent learning how to repair, sidestep, inoculate, or eradicate 
the issues caused by the American system of governance; the suggestions put forth by such an 
analysis would at least have the potential to translate into reforms that could in fact be effected.  
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Background 
 
The American System 
 
 
 To placate both Federalists and anti-Federalists, the framers of the U.S. Constitution were 
forced to compromise to reach an agreement that both protected states’ rights and vested 
supervisory power in a national government.  Both because the system was based upon 
compromise and because the form of democracy was a great experiment, former President of the 
Brookings Institute Bruce MacLaury acknowledges that “the framers themselves, when they 
adjourned after that hot summer in Philadelphia, were the first to acknowledge that their 
handiwork was less than perfect and that, as the nation gained experience under the Constitution, 
it would have to reexamine its provisions and, as necessary, modify them.”1  If the framers 
intended the Constitution to be amended, they certainly did not make it an easy feat to 
accomplish.  To do so, either 2/3 of both houses of Congress must propose an amendment or 2/3 
of state legislatures must call upon Congress, via a national convention, to propose an 
amendment.  Subsequently, 3/4 of state legislatures, or conventions in 3/4 of the states, must 
approve the amendment.  Thus, as time goes on and America and Americans become more and 
more content with the Constitution by precedent, the process renders amendments possible only 
in cases of unusual unanimity. 
 It is unsurprising that of the Constitution’s twenty-seven amendments, only two have 
affected the nature of governmental institutions.  Still, as Sundquist points out, neither of those 
                                                
1 Sundquist, James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1992.  Page v. 
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two adjusted the distribution of power among the branches of government and its institutions.1  
The Seventeenth amendment addressed the manner in which Senators would be elected, 
providing that they be directly elected by the populace rather than appointed by state legislatures, 
and the Twenty-second amendment limited a president to two terms in office.  While these 
amendments did have an important impact on governance and politics, they did not alter the 
structures of government or how those structures interoperate. 
 That amendments addressing the structural design of the American government have 
been few and far between is not only a symptom of the process required to amend the 
Constitution; polarization vis-à-vis party politics has also played a role in preventing 
amendments.  As the directive under which the government operates, the Constitution exists 
circumscribed within a continually evolving nation.  Since ratification, the political landscape 
has been increasingly characterized by a degree of polarization (fueled by the two-party system) 
that the founders neither intended nor welcomed; warnings against factions are to be found in 
Madison’s Federalist No. 51 and in George Washington’s farewell address as President.  
Coupled by separation of powers, party organization is uniquely complicated in a presidential 
system (relative to a parliamentary system).  Parties “are presidentialized because the executive 
election rather than factors specific to legislative elections drive legislative party success.”2  
Additionally, 
“under parliamentarism’s fusion of executive and legislative authority, parties organize to win legislative seats, and 
retain maximum accountability over their prime-ministerial agents.  Yet under the separation of origin and/or 
survival, parties face different organizational and behavioral incentives.  When voters have two agents—the 
legislative party and a president—parties face more complex intraparty delegation and accountability problems.  
                                                
1 Sundquist, James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1992.  Page 3. 
2 Samuels, David J. and Matthew S. Shugart.  Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of 
Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  Page 127. 
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Moreover, when winning the executive branch directly—rather than winning legislative seats—becomes parties’ 
driving goal, parties must favor ‘vote-seeking’ incentives in election campaigns.”1 
 
 It is this level of polarization that has so often proved an impediment to Congress’ ability 
to act.  Any bills that address issues outside of minutia or that are in any way controversial have 
a propensity to be held hostage by the parties, used as pawns in the perpetual chess game 
between the Democrats and Republicans.  The ability to obstruct legislation from progressing 
through Congress is certainly enabled by the design of the American government.  There is a 
time and place where deference to the status quo is useful, e.g. where popular opinion overrides 
logic or the well-being of certain demographics.  This power is increasingly abused, to say 
nothing of situations where the status quo is wrong, e.g. laws hampering the extension of civil 
rights to African Americans in the 1950’s and ‘60’s.   
‘Obamacare’ is a useful example.  The status quo must be overcome, as the current state 
of healthcare in the U.S. is dire to say the least.  Legitimate differences in opinion regarding how 
to alleviate the problems notwithstanding, abuse of the structures and procedures of American 
government led to the bill being so compromised as to render the package dysfunctional the day 
it was signed into law.  Exploitation of the separation of powers between the president and the 
legislature and the difficulty associated with mustering a sixty-senator majority to prevent a 
Republican filibuster from occurring caused President Obama and Democratic Congressional 
leadership to trade ideology for action.  In making such a trade, the effort risks being reduced to 
a political stunt—a bullet in the chamber to showcase success in future election campaigns—and 
nothing more. 
 
                                                
1 Samuels, David J. and Matthew S. Shugart.  Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of 
Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  Page 162. 
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 How Should the U.S. Reform Its System? 
 
 
 One can certainly understand the great deal of research put into analyzing and trying to 
find solutions for a system that appears to be broken.  To wit, the cry against ‘politics as usual’ 
has become ‘politics as usual.’  Under the leadership of Douglas Dillon, a committee was put 
together to find a solution.  The Committee on the Constitutional System (CCS), formed in 1981, 
concluded that the problem lies “with a system which promotes divisiveness and makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to develop truly national policies.”1  Specifically, CCS’ efforts 
examined five questions highlighted by Sundquist: 
1. “Would an electoral system that encouraged unified party control of the three centers of 
decisionmaking—presidency, Senate, and House—make for more effective, responsible, 
and accountable government? 
2. Would longer terms for the president or for legislators, and a longer span between 
elections, enable leaders to rise to a higher level of statesmanship in confronting crucial 
issues, permit the resolution of issues that now go unresolved because of the short two-
year life of each successive Congress, and allow greater deliberation and care in the 
legislative process? 
3. Can a better solution be devised to deal with the immobility of government brought 
about by leadership failure, or deadlock and quarreling between the president and the 
Congress, than simply waiting around helplessly until the next presidential election 
comes around? 
4. Can harmonious collaboration between the executive and legislative branches be 
introduced through formal interlocking of the branches or through the political parties 
that are the web that binds administrators and legislators to a common purpose? 
5. Should any of the constitutional checks and balances by which the executive and 
legislative branches are enabled to thwart each other be modified to permit one or the 
other branch to prevail more readily and thus facilitate decisions?”2 
 
 
                                                
1 Sundquist, James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1992.  Page 11. 
2 Sundquist, James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1992.  Pages 10-11. 
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The Argument for Parliamentary Reforms 
 
 
What would be expected from a system that unifies party control over the executive and 
legislative branches, interlocks said branches, increases the amount of time between elections for 
legislators, provides a mechanism to abandon an ineffective government, and provides for the 
dominant position of a particular branch?  No scholar of models of democracy will be surprised 
to learn that the CSS was quite enamored with the parliamentary model.  Dillon “has suggested 
that the answer to this country’s governmental stalemate ‘could well be some form of 
parliamentary democracy.’”1  Former Senator and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
committee J. William Fulbright commended “the parliamentary system, with its unification of 
the executive and legislature, as in many ways ‘a superior form of democracy.’”2  The hallmarks 
of the parliamentary model are as follows:   
“In parliamentary democracy the voters elect a legislature.  The members of the legislature, in turn, elect the 
executive.3  Executive authority, vested in a cabinet headed by a prime minister, derives from the results of 
parliamentary elections, and not directly from the voice of the people.  Moreover, the prime minister and the cabinet 
are agents of the parliamentary majority, to whom they are accountable: that is, the executive serves at the pleasure 
of the legislative majority.”4 
 
In the parliamentary model, a “legislative majority is [therefore] sovereign, and a committee of 
that majority—the cabinet—both leads the legislature and directs the executive branch.  Strong 
                                                
1 Tufts University address, May 30, 1982, in Sundquist, James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992.  Page 19. 
2 J. William Fulbright with Seth P. Tillman, The Price of an Empire (Pantheon Books, 1989), p. 45, in Sundquist, 
James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992.  
Page 19. 
3 Footnote from Samuels & Shugart: “For present purposes it does not matter if the legislature is unicameral or 
bicamerial.” 
4 Samuels, David J. and Matthew S. Shugart.  Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of 
Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  Page 26. 
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party discipline assures prime ministers and their cabinets that they normally can act quickly and 
decisively without fear of being repudiated by their legislatures.”1 
These are fairly convincing arguments.  As aforementioned, however, a wholesale switch to a 
parliamentary system will never happen.  The process for amending the Constitution is too 
difficult.  Additionally, even if our governmental model could be changed, Americans would not 
want to.  We are proud of our system, broken as it may be.  We are proud of the constitutional 
ideals that underpin the system.  And we are proud of our independence.  In the eyes of some, if 
not those of many, to go back to a parliamentary system would be to admit failure of the 
principles on which the U.S. was founded and the superiority of a system of government from 
which we tried so hard to break away.   
At least one significant member of the CCS shared this view.  Co-chair Lloyd Cutler pulled 
back to more practical solutions by suggesting that “‘the most one can hope for is a set of modest 
changes that would make our structure work somewhat more in the manner of a parliamentary 
system, with somewhat less separation between the executive and the legislature than now 
exists.’”2 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Sundquist, James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1992.  Page 18. 
2 “To Form a Government,” p. 139, in Sundquist, James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992.  Page 19. 
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Manifestation of Reforms 
 
Longer Term Lengths 
  
If the U.S. were to alter its system in accordance with Cutler’s recommendations, what 
would reform look like?  As to term length, concern has been voiced that the 2-6-4-year term 
lengths for House members, senators, and presidents, respectively, hurts politicians’ ability to 
focus on policy.  Short term lengths require politicians to spend a significant amount of their 
time campaigning.  Additionally, Sundquist suggests that shorter term lengths reduce the 
honeymoon period when Congress and the White House are likely to work together towards 
accomplishing agenda points.1  CCS suggests a 4-8-4 schedule, more in line with the 
Westminster model, in which a government lasts five years and the prime minister is free to set a 
General Election whenever (s)he chooses.2,3  Though this would not eliminate the issues 
associated with term lengths, it would shorten the period when the legislative process is stymied 
by campaign concerns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Sundquist, James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1992.  Page 145. 
2 Ironically, the Coalition government has currently put forth a Bill (the Fixed-Term Parliaments Bill 2010-11) that, 
if passed, would fix the length of Parliament at five years from the date of first sitting.  Elections would be held on 
the first Thursday in May.  At present, the bill is in committee stage in the Lords. 
3 Sundquist, James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1992.  Page 159. 
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Broader Use of Impeachment 
 
 
In situations where leadership fails, Sundquist argues for an expansion of the 
impeachment clause.1  It should grow, he posits, to include failures of “maladministration.”2  
Given broader utility, impeachment would function similarly to a parliamentary vote of no 
confidence.  In the Westminster model, if a majority of the House of Commons loses faith in a 
government, a vote of no confidence requires either that the government resigns and a new 
government be created, or that the sovereign dissolves Parliament and call a General Election.  
Similarity notwithstanding, broader impeachment and votes of no confidence remain disparate: 
an impeachment conviction merely removes the official in question and reaches down the chain 
of command to replace him/her, rather than removing the entire government.  Thus, even if 
failures of maladministration were impeachable, the procedure still would not address overall 
governmental failure.  On the other hand, one could argue that separation of powers leads to a 
compartmentalization of power in which it might be more useful to simply dispose of one bad 
compartment rather than shutting down the entire operation.  The intended operation of the 
Titanic is a useful analogy: if one section of the hull became compromised and took on water, it 
would be sealed off from the rest of the boat, sacrificing that section and those in it at the time to 
ensure survival of the rest.  It is not certain that expanded use of impeachment could address 
stalemate in government.  Still, such reform would cause the U.S. to operate more like a 
parliament. 
                                                
1 Sundquist, James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1992.  Page 204. 
2 Sundquist, James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1992.  Page p. 204. 
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Interlocking of Branches 
  
An interlocking of government branches and the more unified party control that would 
result would cause the U.S. to move away from separation of powers.  This is one of the biggest 
structural differences between the American and British systems of government.  Such a reform 
considers “either putting legislators in the executive branch or putting officials of that branch—
usually cabinet members—in the legislature.”1  Termed ‘dual officeholding,’ CSS has suggested 
that “repeal of the clause would ‘broaden both the range of talent available to a President in 
forming his administration and the base of political leadership in the executive branch,’ and 
appointment of leading legislators to cabinet positions ‘might encourage closer collaboration’ 
between the branches and ‘help to prevent stalemates.’”2  
 
Overriding Checks & Balances 
 
 
Lastly, Sundquist proposes providing situational ability of one branch of the federal 
government to override the checks and balances the others may place on it.  He sees the potential 
for this to occur in context of “the weakening of one or more of the veto powers.”3  Yet, just as 
quickly as he proposes such reform, he acknowledges that empowering one branch over the 
others would not reduce the “disharmony that now so often saps the effectiveness of 
                                                
1 Stephen Horn, The Cabinet and Congress (Columbia University Press, 1960), page 211 in Sundquist, James L.  
Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992.  Page 232. 
2 Committee on the Constitutional System, “A Bicentennial Analysis of the American Political Structure” 
(Washington, January 1987), pages 11-12 in Sundquist, James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992.  Page 233. 
3 Sundquist, James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1992.  Page 279. 
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government;” such an empowerment merely sidesteps the issue.1  Because separation of powers 
would remain in place, the relationship between such a reform and the parliamentary model is 
tenuous.  Nonetheless, such reform is in the spirit of the unified control and decision-making that 
are to be found in Westminster. 
 
  
 
In light of the suggestions proposed, should the U.S. enact reforms toward emulating the 
Westminster governmental model?  Put aside for the length of this work that the abovementioned 
reforms will not be enacted, and just think about whether they should happen.  
The British government enjoys significant, albeit relative, ease of responsiveness and ability to 
act.  But how truly easy is that ease of responsiveness?  Moreover, is ease of responsiveness 
what is needed? 
                                                
1 Sundquist, James L.  Constitutional Reform and Effective Governance.  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1992.  Page 279. 
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The Expenses Scandal 
 
 
There is currently an exhibit at the British Library in London showcasing the evolution of 
the English language.  From its roots in the single-digit centuries A.D., the exhibit chronicles 
evolution of syntax, grammar, word choice, and dialect.  A few miles away in the House of 
Lords chamber, a word has recently surfaced with increasing regularity that might very well be 
on display in the British Library as patently American and emblematic of the stalemate that has 
become the norm in American politics.  This word is foreign to the British.   
The word is filibuster.  A concept no American could avoid even if only tuning into CNN 
while channel surfing, the filibuster is a hallmark of American democracy.  Though the majority 
party in the Senate is always quick to complain about the filibuster’s all too frequent exploitation 
by those across the aisle to block legislation, they will use it to their advantage the next time 
party control shifts.  The potency of a filibuster is not restricted to its use: the mere threat of it 
requires compromise on legislation that can severely affect the policy output. 
The environment in the House of Lords is a different beast altogether.  A vestige of the 
respect and courtesy that members of the British upper class are meant to exhibit when engaging 
with one another, the thought of killing legislation by holding it hostage because one does not 
agree with it is justifiably alien.  Many Tory peers have nevertheless suggested that is exactly 
what Labour was trying to do to the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill.  The 
bill calls a referendum on May 5th, 2011, whereby the electorate will decide whether to abandon 
the First Past the Post electoral system in favor of an Alternative Vote system.  First Past the 
Post is a winner-take-all system where the candidate who wins a plurality of votes (not 
necessarily a majority) wins the seat; AV entails a ranking system—voters rank candidates and 
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first choice rankings are tallied.  If no candidate receives a majority, the candidate with the 
lowest votes is eliminated and those votes are redistributed to the candidate ranked second on the 
ballot.  This process is carried out until a candidate receives a majority.  
What really concerns Labour about the bill is a provision that would eliminate and 
redistrict fifty seats in the House of Commons.  Anxious that the government will target 
redistricting to Labour’s disadvantage, Labour politicians worry that it will become much more 
difficult for them to win future elections.  Jon Cruddas, MP for Dangenham and Rainham, goes 
so far as to opine that the bill is part of a comprehensive Tory effort to enforce its electoral 
majority by systematically disenfranchising the Labour electorate.1  Tories argue that Labour has 
been unfairly privileged by the election process to date, and that they simply want to even the 
playing field.2   
The bill is clearly politically charged and laden with partisan interests.  As part of the 
Lords’ function to review and scrutinize the legislative efforts of the Commons, it could delay 
the bill for up to a year (which, politically, could be a crucially important amount of time); to do 
so would, however, be out of fashion for the Lords.  That the Lords debated the bill in committee 
for seventeen days (on certain days sitting all night in discussion) is reflective of the tense 
environment.  This mood has also been present at two other times: during responses to the 
expenses scandal in 2009 and in the current austerity plan debate.  I know because I was there, 
inside Westminster, on both occasions.  
 
 
                                                
1 Cruddas, Jon, MP for Dagenham and Rainham.  Personal Interview.  2 Feb. 2011. 
2 O’Brien, Neil.  Personal Interview.  3 Feb. 2011. 
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Background of the Parliamentary Expense System 
 
 Self-regulation is a prominent feature of the British political system.  This has come 
about in a conscious attempt to insulate Parliament from the influence of the Crown.  Hugh 
Tomlinson QC, a barrister involved in exposing the expenses scandal, suggests that public life 
and politics in Britain have therefore become conceptually opaque and closed off from public 
scrutiny.  A legacy of this opacity has been that MPs have not felt the need to publicly justify 
their use of expenses to the public.  Then-head of the House of Commons Fees Office, Andrew 
Walker, has been quoted as saying that “MPs should be allowed to carry on their duties free from 
interference” and that “transparency will damage democracy.”1  In hindsight this disinterest in 
revealing expenses may have resulted from the knowledge that many MPs were wildly abusing 
the privilege; on an individual level, however, it does not seem entirely illegitimate that MPs 
would not share with the public what kind of tea they prefer via receipts from train rides from 
constituency to London.  Theoretically, where no malfeasance is involved, the legacy of self-
regulation and opacity seems justifiable. 
 In August, 1911, MPs began to receive a yearly salary, set at £400.  That number has 
steadily increased over the past century.  As of April 1st, 2010, it was set at £65,738.2  This is in 
contrast with a national salary average of £25,000, which is currently increasing yearly by less 
than inflation.3  The politics of wages and finances are made more complicated by the current 
                                                
1 Brooke, Heather.  “Unsung Hero.”  Guardian.co.uk.  The Guardian, 15 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/may/15/mps-expenses-heather-brooke-foi>. 
2 Parliament.  “Frequently Asked Questions: MPs.”  www.parliament.uk.  UK Parliament, n.d.  Web.  1 March 2011.  
<http://www.parliament.uk/about/faqs/house-of-commons-faqs/members-faq-page2/>.  
3 Unknown.  “UK unemployment total rises again.”  www.bbc.co.uk.  The British Broadcast Corporation, 16 Feb. 
2011.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12477563>. , Woods, David.  “Any salary 
increases in 2011 are expected to be below the rate of inflation.”  www.hrmagazine.co.uk.  HR Magazine, 26 Oct. 
2010.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.hrmagazine.co.uk/news/1037043/salary-increases-2011-expected-below-
rate-inflation/>. 
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economic climate, with unemployment on the rise at 7.9% nationally and 20.5% for 16 to 24 
year-olds.1 
 With expenses exempt by precedent from the public domain, increases in the overall 
amount of money MPs receive have been steered towards expenses.  In the 1980’s the Commons 
debated increasing MPs salaries.  Ultimately it opted instead to increase expenses, which Lord 
Jenkin of Roding described as being “politically easier.”2  Whether or not this was the first time 
that a stealthy increase in MPs finances occurred, it nevertheless sent the message to MPs that 
being less than forthright about compensation is acceptable. 
  
The Fight Over Expense Publication 
 
 
This background set the stage for a battle between journalists Heather Brooke, Ben 
Leapman of the Daily Telegraph, Jon Ungoed-Thomas of the Sunday Times, and the Commons.  
Ironically, the impetus for the clash was instigated by the Commons in an effort to add a degree 
of transparency to British politics.  In 2000 Parliament passed the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 (FOI).3  The act’s preamble does justice to its intent: FOI serves to “make provision for the 
disclosure of information held by public authorities or by persons providing services for them.”4   
                                                
1 Unknown.  “UK unemployment total rises again.”  www.bbc.co.uk.  The British Broadcast Corporation, 16 Feb. 
2011.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12477563>. , Woods, David.  “Any salary 
increases in 2011 are expected to be below the rate of inflation.”  www.hrmagazine.co.uk.  HR Magazine, 26 Oct. 
2010.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.hrmagazine.co.uk/news/1037043/salary-increases-2011-expected-below-
rate-inflation/>. 
2 House of Lords Hansard, 8 July 2009. 
3 For those interested in perusing the language of the act, it may be viewed online at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/contents 
4 Houses of Parliament.  “Freedom of Information Act 2000.”  www.legislation.gov.uk.  legislation.gov.uk, n.d.  
Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/introduction>. 
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Though FOI achieved Royal Assent in 2000, the act would not come into effect until 
2005.  Brooke, Leapman, and Ungoed-Thomas were initially interested in testing FOI’s utility.  
Brooke was conducting research for an upcoming book entitled Your Right to Know, and 
Leapman and Ungoed-Thomas were interested (respectively) in testing FOI’s efficacy.1  As the 
act mandates, every entity with information to be requested under FOI provisions must have an 
officer to carry out these requests.  As anyone who has ever waited in line at the DMV knows, 
government bureaucracy is a nightmare.  It is, therefore, less than shocking that Brooke had 
difficulty navigating the Parliament switchboard to find said officer.2   
Eventually locating the FOI officer, Brooke’s request, along with Leapman’s and 
Ungoed-Thomas’ requests, was rejected.  FOI permits information to be exempted “for the 
purpose of avoiding an infringement of the privileges of either House of Parliament.”3  Not only 
is the rejection justified by potential security risks (keeping in mind that in the Westminster 
model, members of the executive branch are first and foremost members of the legislature, and 
so potentially sensitive information related to money spent by the Prime Minister and his/her 
team must be carefully guarded), but the opacity element all but guaranteed that Westminster 
would not release the information.  Whitehall probably did not expect the decision to be 
appealed; the need for government privilege and privacy makes sense. 
The journalists did appeal.  The next step in the process was for them to appeal to 
Information Commissioner (an office established by FOI) Richard Thomas, the UK’s 
                                                
1 Leapman, Ben.  “Ben Leapman: My four-year battle for the truth over MPs’ expenses.”  www.telegraph.co.uk.  
The Telegraph, 10 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-
expenses/5301739/Ben-Leapman-My-four-year-battle-for-the-truth-over-MPs-expenses.html>. , Brooke, Heather.  
“Unsung Hero.”  Guardian.co.uk.  The Guardian, 15 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/may/15/mps-expenses-heather-brooke-foi>. 
2 Brooke, Heather.  “Unsung Hero.”  Guardian.co.uk.  The Guardian, 15 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/may/15/mps-expenses-heather-brooke-foi>. 
3 Houses of Parliament.  “Freedom of Information Act 2000.”  www.legislation.gov.uk.  legislation.gov.uk, n.d.  
Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/section/34>. 
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“independent authority set up to uphold information rights in the public interest, promoting 
openness by public bodies and data privacy for individuals.”1  The appeals were filed in 2005 
and 2006, and Brooke mentions that it is not uncommon for requests to go unanswered for 
upwards of a year.2  In June, 2007, Thomas bundled the journalists’ appeals into one decision, 
with which no one was pleased.  Thomas agreed that the more detailed analysis of MPs’ 
expenses for which the journalists called needed to be made available.  However, his opinion and 
decision was that this analysis would best take shape by narrower categorization of expense 
claims.3  Affirming FOI’s exemption for parliamentary privilege, the request for publication of 
the raw data was rejected.4  Brooke retorted in response that neither would that give her the detail 
she needed nor was the Commons interested in complying with narrower categories; to do so 
would have caused Westminster more work than publishing the raw data outright.5   
As expected, the Commons appealed Thomas’ decision.  Likewise, the journalists 
counter-appealed.  The case was sent to an Information Tribunal in February, 2008.6  The 
decision reached on February 26th dealt a critical blow to the Commons.  The Commons appeal 
was rejected, and the tribunal agreed with the counter-appeal that the full details of MPs’ 
expenses, receipts included, should be published.  Had Parliament ended its battle here and 
                                                
1 Unknown.  “Data Protection and Freedom of Information Advice – ICO.”  www.ico.gov.uk.  Information 
Commissioner’s Office, n.d.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.ico.gov.uk>. 
2 Brooke, Heather.  “Unsung Hero.”  Guardian.co.uk.  The Guardian, 15 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/may/15/mps-expenses-heather-brooke-foi>. 
3 Brooke, Heather.  “Unsung Hero.”  Guardian.co.uk.  The Guardian, 15 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/may/15/mps-expenses-heather-brooke-foi>. 
4 Unknown.  “MPs’ expenses scandal: the timeline.”  www.independent.co.uk.  The Independent UK and the Press 
Association, 3 February 2010.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mps-
expenses-scandal-the-timeline-1888349.html>. 
5 Brooke, Heather.  “Unsung Hero.”  Guardian.co.uk.  The Guardian, 15 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/may/15/mps-expenses-heather-brooke-foi>. 
6 Unknown.  “MPs’ expenses scandal: the timeline.”  www.independent.co.uk.  The Independent UK and the Press 
Association, 3 February 2010.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mps-
expenses-scandal-the-timeline-1888349.html>. 
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complied, public opinion may have been content with the conclusion that the Commons fought 
back simply because of the great amount of work Thomas’ remedy would have caused its staff. 
Parliament remained discontent, and yet again appealed.  At this point one starts to 
wonder what the Commons was trying to hide.  Brooke stated during an interview with the 
Guardian that for the Commons to press further was ill-advised: “either way they look foolish, 
incompetent and so wedded to secrecy they throw money away or there is some incredible 
scandal they are trying to hide.”1 
Brooke was wrong.  The Commons did not look incompetent or as though it was trying to 
hide from scandal.  The Commons looked both incompetent and as though it was trying to hide 
from scandal.  Under the leadership of the Speaker of the House at the time, Rt. Hon. Michael 
Martin MP, the Commons appealed the Tribunal’s decision at the end of March, 2008.  In the 
effort, Martin’s legal team ran up fees of £150,000.2  On May 16th the High Court (one of the 
highest courts of England and Wales) ruled against the appeal, upholding the decision of the 
Tribunal.  In the decision, the judges stated: “we are not here dealing with idle gossip, or public 
curiosity about what in truth are trivialities.  The expenditure of public money through the 
payment of MPs’ salaries and allowances is a matter of direct and reasonable interest to the 
taxpayer.”3   
Though the Commons did not publicly pursue the matter further, within Westminster the 
wheels began turning to bypass the Court’s authority.  After announcing that the House would 
                                                
1 Brooke, Heather.  “Unsung Hero.”  Guardian.co.uk.  The Guardian, 15 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/may/15/mps-expenses-heather-brooke-foi>. 
2 Leapman, Ben.  “Ben Leapman: My four-year battle for the truth over MPs’ expenses.”  www.telegraph.co.uk.  
The Telegraph, 10 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-
expenses/5301739/Ben-Leapman-My-four-year-battle-for-the-truth-over-MPs-expenses.html>. 
3 Leapman, Ben.  “Ben Leapman: My four-year battle for the truth over MPs’ expenses.”  www.telegraph.co.uk.  
The Telegraph, 10 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-
expenses/5301739/Ben-Leapman-My-four-year-battle-for-the-truth-over-MPs-expenses.html>. 
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publish all receipts in October, 2008, Julian Lewis, MP for New Forest East, successfully led a 
movement to exempt MPs’ addresses from FOI jurisdiction, passed by an order in July, 2008.1  
The October deadline passed.  Westminster pushed the deadline to December, and again this 
deadline passed. 
It is likely that the Commons intended to delay publishing expenses until it could 
successfully exempt itself completely from FOI.  Upon returning from Christmas recess in 
January, 2009, the Leader of the House of Commons, Rt. Hon. Harriet Harman MP, led a motion 
that would have achieved just that.2  The motion was defeated, and July, 2009 was set as the new 
release date for receipts.3 
The Scandal 
 
 
The public could not have expected what was to come.  After half a decade of legal 
battles and passed deadlines, it is likely the public did not much care anymore (if it ever did).  
After all the journalists’ hard work, none of Brooke’s, Leapman’s, Ungoed-Thomas’, or their 
legal teams’ efforts directly mattered.  In March, 2009, a disk was stolen from the Parliamentary 
Fees Office that contained the full details of MPs expense claims.  The Daily Telegraph later 
acquired that disk, and on May 8th, 2009, the paper published the information.4  Some of the 
more egregious offenses include: £25,000 claimed by Rt. Hon. Barbara Follett MP for private 
                                                
1 Leapman, Ben.  “Ben Leapman: My four-year battle for the truth over MPs’ expenses.”  www.telegraph.co.uk.  
The Telegraph, 10 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-
expenses/5301739/Ben-Leapman-My-four-year-battle-for-the-truth-over-MPs-expenses.html>. 
2 Leapman, Ben.  “Ben Leapman: My four-year battle for the truth over MPs’ expenses.”  www.telegraph.co.uk.  
The Telegraph, 10 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-
expenses/5301739/Ben-Leapman-My-four-year-battle-for-the-truth-over-MPs-expenses.html>. 
3 Brooke, Heather.  “Unsung Hero.”  Guardian.co.uk.  The Guardian, 15 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/may/15/mps-expenses-heather-brooke-foi>. 
4 Unknown.  “MPs’ expenses scandal: the timeline.”  www.independent.co.uk.  The Independent UK and the Press 
Association, 3 February 2010.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mps-
expenses-scandal-the-timeline-1888349.html>. 
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security patrols outside her home, £125,000 claimed by Rt. Hon. Stephen Byers MP for repairs 
and maintenance on a London home owned by his partner and where he lives rent-free, and 
£125,000 claimed by Andrew Rosindell MP for a second home in London while he claimed his 
childhood home—where his mother continued to live 17mi. away—as his primary residence.  
Some, while not egregious, might raise eyebrows: Rt. Hon. the Lord Reid of Cardowan, during 
his time as an MP, claimed expenses for slotted spoons, an ironing board, and a “glittery loo 
seat;” Mike Penning MP claimed £2.99 for a stainless steel dog bowl; Bob Laxton MP claimed 
£1,049 for a television because, as the Telegraph quotes, he was too busy to shop around. 1   
The general public was angry.  Their hard-earned tax money was being spent on glittery 
toilet seats and unnecessarily nice TVs.  This dishonesty (or fraud, or criminal behavior, 
depending on how one chooses to look at it) could not have been revealed at a worse a time: a 
worldwide economic meltdown had just occurred months earlier on a scale not seen since the 
Great Depression.  Opinion at the time ranged from furious to disappointed.  For some the abuse 
was a slap in the face; for others it merely confirmed that politicians are sleazy and dishonest, 
fueling disillusionment with politics. 
As is typical of a major crisis, the media and the public looked for someone to blame.  
The fiasco occurred on Labour’s watch—they seemed a good place to start.  What’s more, 
efforts by Labour leadership from Martin (who, as the Speaker, was supposed to be party-
neutral) to Harman to shield expenses from public scrutiny seemed all the more devious in light 
of this new information.  Martin’s involvement in the scandal, which had been alleged for many 
years, was confirmed; the Guardian quite viciously reported that “the speaker [sic] and Mrs. 
                                                
1 These figures were obtained from, and the full list of those investigated by the Daily Telegraph can be found at: 
Unknown.  “MPs’ expenses: Full list of MPs investigated by the Telegraph.”  www.telegraph.co.uk.  The Telegraph, 
8 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-expenses/5297606/MPs-
expenses-Full-list-of-MPs-investigated-by-the-Telegraph.html>. 
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Martin have been plundering the public purse for an almost grotesque array of personal perks 
and foreign junkets.”1  Further troublesome for Labour was the fast-approaching end of the 
government term, with an election to follow by May, 2010.  Even though Tories and Lib Dems 
were caught with their hands in the cookie jar as well, in-charge Labour had the biggest target 
painted on its back.  
The severity of media and public displeasure should not be underestimated.  Hugh 
Tomlinson describes the scandal explosion as a crucial moment when, had the election happened 
at that time, the potential existed for an entire generation of politicians to be swept out as the 
electorate vented its frustrations at the ballot box.2  As such, it became difficult even for honest 
MPs to escape the witch-hunt.  The Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. David Cameron MP, at the time the 
Leader of the Opposition, was targeted for claiming expenses on candy bars, even though they 
were being claimed as part of his staff members’ lunches (a fairly innocuous expense).3  Andrew 
Anthony, a journalist for the Guardian, reported that by the end of May MPs were speaking “of a 
suicidal atmosphere in Parliament.”4  The likelihood of a total slate cleaning aside, the potential 
for such an upheaval highlights a significant difference between British and American politics: in 
the American system, the staggering of elections and separation of elections for congressmen, 
senators, and the president prevents a crisis from wiping out an entire political incumbency. 
Tomlinson makes a further interesting point on the public response apropos of the nature 
of the parties.  He suggests that precisely because the crisis happened on Labour’s watch, the 
                                                
1 Unknown.  “Gordon Brown must rediscover his moral compass.”  www.guardian.co.uk.  The Guardian: The 
Observer, 19 April 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/19/gordon-
brown-damian-macbride-draper>. 
2 Tomlinson QC, Hugh.  Personal Interview.  31 Jan. 2011. 
3 Tomlinson QC, Hugh.  Personal Interview.  31 Jan. 2011. 
4 Anthony, Andrew.  “Will Lewis: the man with an expense account.”  www.guardian.co.uk.  The Guardian: The 
Observer, 24 May 2009.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/may/24/will-lewis-daily-
telegraph-profile>. 
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response was more venomous.  As the name suggests, Labour’s left-wing and ‘of the people’ 
heritage suggests that concern for the working middle and lower class of Britain motivates all 
that Labour politicians do.  In that way they might be considered akin to the Democrats.  
Conversely, the Conservative party, on the right of the ideological spectrum, is the promoter of 
business and a smaller national government with powers devolved to localities—akin to the 
Republicans.  Since Labour is seen as the protector of the working-class, it seems all the more 
shocking that the theft and expenditure of constituents’ tax money was allowed to occur on their 
watch.  The implication is that it would have been less shocking if the Tories, as stereotypically 
interested in protecting businesses and wealthier Britons, were the ones abusing expense 
privileges.  From a popular opinion standpoint, there may be some truth to Tomlinson’s 
hypothesis.  On the other hand, point of view undermines the usefulness of the argument: a 
Labour supporter might rationalize the scandal had it occurred during a Tory government by 
saying ‘that figures, the Tories are cheats and liars.’  Now flip the situation: a Tory supporter 
could just as easily rationalize the scandal occurring under Labour by saying ‘that figures, 
Labour are liars and cheats.’  The situation can easily be perceived as shocking or unsurprising 
depending on the combination of who was in charge and the partisan bias of the person making 
the comment. 
 
The Response 
 
 
If there was any chance for Labour to turn the situation around and stave off imminent 
election defeat in 2010, No. 10 and the Front Bench would have to come up with a good 
solution, and fast.  For Gordon Brown, the silver lining may have been that if the government 
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was able to come back with a good response and frame it properly, Labour might be able to look 
at least reactively responsible for dealing with a situation in which the whole House was 
involved irrespective of party affiliation.  It was an opportunity for Brown to push a 
constitutional reform agenda, one in which he had always been interested.  
During Tony Blair’s premiership, Blair seems not to have been particularly interested in 
constitutional reform, evidenced by his lack of stewardship over the reform efforts put forth 
during his time in No. 10.  In Tony Blair and the Constitution, Professor the Lord Norton of 
Louth charges that “under Tony Blair’s leadership, the British constitution has undergone 
extensive change, unparalleled in recent British history, but without the Prime Minister having a 
developed view of what form of constitution is desirable for the United Kingdom.”1  In The 
Political Quarterly from Winter, 2010, Matthew Flinders categorizes the loss of interest between 
1997-2007 by epithet.  He terms the period from 1997-2001 “activity,” when reforms included: 
devolution to Scotland, England, Wales and London, independent operation of the Bank of 
England, and the introduction of FOI.  2001-2005 is titled “fatigue,” characterized by less 
aggressive reforms that, through the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, included the creation of 
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom—which transferred appellate judicial power away 
from the ‘Law Lords,’ the judicial body of the House of Lords that had previously served that 
role—and amended the role of the Lord Chancellor by reducing the position’s power (the Lord 
Chancellor had previously been the head officer of the House of Lords and the judiciary).  The 
                                                
1 Professor the Lord Norton of Louth.  “British Politics – Abstract of article: Tony Blair and the Constitution.”  
www.palgrave-journals.com.  Palgrave Macmillan, n.d.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/bp/journal/v2/n2/abs/4200060a.html>. 
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last period is “anomie,” with “no significant measures or leadership concerning the future 
agenda, direction of constitutional travel or ‘unfinished business.’”1 
By contrast, Gordon Brown, even as Blair’s Chancellor, had always been more interested 
in constitutional reform.  As Chancellor, Flinders chronicles that “Brown had always been more 
sensitive to the existence and implications of constitutional anomie, and during the government’s 
second term (2001-2005) he signaled his anxieties in a number of speeches and statements in 
which he called for a ‘new constitutional settlement.’”2  Perhaps much of the difficulty Brown 
found in pushing through such an agenda stemmed from the fact that, as Lord Norton describes, 
Blair “generated a set of constitutional changes that do not hang together, and he bequeaths to his 
successor an absence of any coherent view of what type of constitution is appropriate.”3 
In spite of the difficulties, Brown hit the ground running when he moved from No. 11 to 
No. 10.  Almost immediately after taking office at the end of June, 2007, the government 
published a green paper entitled The Governance of Britain (Cm.7170).  Focused on 
“constitutional renewal,” the document was broken down by broad categories: limiting the 
powers of the executive, making the executive more accountable, re-invigorating British 
democracy, and strengthening the link between the citizen and the state.4  From the very 
beginning of the document, the paper highlights Brown’s interest in the connection between 
citizens and the government, using language such as: “strong bond between people and 
                                                
1 Flinders, Matthew.  “Bagehot Smiling: Gordon Brown’s ‘New Constitution’ and the Revolution that Did Not 
Happen.”  The Political Quarterly 81.1 (2010): page 66.  Print. 
2 Flinders, Matthew.  “Bagehot Smiling: Gordon Brown’s ‘New Constitution’ and the Revolution that Did Not 
Happen.”  The Political Quarterly 81.1 (2010): page 65.  Print. 
3 Professor the Lord Norton of Louth, ‘Tony Blair and the Constitution,’ page 269, in Flinders, Matthew.  “Bagehot 
Smiling: Gordon Brown’s ‘New Constitution’ and the Revolution that Did Not Happen.”  The Political Quarterly 
81.1 (2010): page 65.  Print. 
4 Rt. Hon. Jack Straw MP, Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor.  “Cm.7170: The Governance of 
Britain.”  www.official-documents.gov.uk.  TSO: Information and Publishing Solutions, July 2007.  Web.  1 March 
2011.  <www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm71/7170/7170.pdf>. 
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government” and “forge a new relationship between government and citizen.”1  If the effort was 
a high priority, Brown should be faulted for letting it stall.  Following a report from Summer 
2008 (the Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill First Report)2 indicating 
what should be done in the constitutional reform context, the Constitutional Reform and 
Governance Bill (CRAG) that dealt with these issues was not first read in the House of 
Commons until July 20th, 2009, after the expenses scandal hit.3 
The public seems not to have cared.  When Blair moved to Downing St. in 1997, an Ipsos 
MORI poll on the issues of importance to the public ranked constitutional reform last among 
fourteen issues.4  At the end of Blair’s first term in 2001 (which coincides with Flinder’s “active” 
period), subsequent polling revealed that only 5% of the electorate felt that the constitution was a 
vote-driving factor.5  Fast forward to expenses scandal aftermath: an Ipsos MORI issues index 
poll from June, 2009 recorded that fewer than 1% of the public felt constitutional reform was the 
most important issue facing Britain.6 
The public may not have cared about constitutional reform, but something had to be 
done.  Professor Philip Cowley points out that an existential crisis developed.7  Put simply, the 
public was fed up with Parliament.  What it wanted in response to the scandal, however, was 
abstract.  It wanted honest MPs who worked for constituents and did not steal from them.  It 
                                                
1 Rt. Hon. Jack Straw MP, Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor.  “Cm.7170: The Governance of 
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wanted MPs to listen and respond to its concerns.  How was the government supposed to 
translate these notions into action?  With only a short time before Parliament went on Summer 
recess at the end of June, a remedy needed to be put forward quickly.  So the government hastily 
attempted to push CRAG through.  If MPs could run back to their constituents during the 
Summer recess with their heads held high and CRAG in hand to evidence action (albeit 
reaction), the hope was that the electoral fallout for Labour, though inevitable, might be 
mitigated.  What is important in contrast to the American legislative process is that the 
government could respond as it saw fit.  As the Westminster model operates, if the government 
could rally its back benches and Labour Peers behind CRAG, it could shove CRAG through 
regardless of what the Tories or Lib Dems had to say about the bill.  
Despite the effort made to connect CRAG to the underlying flaws in governance exposed 
by the scandal, it was an ideologically wide-ranging bill, as evidenced by the several categories 
of governance that it affected.  Responding to The Governance of Britain, CRAG “establishes a 
statutory basis for management of the civil service; introduces a new parliamentary process for 
the ratification of treaties; provides for the end of by-election for hereditary peers; makes 
provisions to allow for the suspension, resignation and expulsion of Members of the Lords; 
introduces new rules on time limits for human rights actions against devolved administrations; 
makes various provisions relating to judicial office holders, including the removal of the Prime 
Minister’s role in the process of appointing Supreme Court judges; establishes a new corporate 
structure for the National Audit Office and a limit to the term of appointment to the office of 
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Comptroller and Auditor General; and introduces measures designed to increase the transparency 
of financial reporting to Parliament.”1  
 Since CRAG was largely tangential to the issues exposed by the expenses scandal, a 
more direct response was also necessary.  In June, 2009, the government presented to Parliament 
a paper entitled Building Britain’s Future (Cm.7654) outlining the government’s overall 
response at a “moment of profound change in our country driven by the global economic 
downturn and the crisis of trust in our political system.”2  Though broad in the number of issues 
on which it touches, Brown’s introduction states that the government’s “first and most urgent 
priority as [it] fight[s] for the interests of the British people is to clean up [its politics].  Britain’s 
future cannot be built when [its] politics [are] still governed by the rules of a Victorian past.”3  
To that end, the paper highlights forthcoming legislation to deal with MPs’ expenses, which 
would become the Parliamentary Standards Act (PSA) introduced in the Commons on June 23rd, 
2009, and achieving Royal Assent on July 21st, 2009.4  Though PSA and CRAG were quite 
distinct in their aims, the two should be thought of as the two centerpieces of the comprehensive 
response to the expenses scandal.  This point is emphasized in Brown’s introduction to Building 
Britain’s Future: 
“We stand for a decent, honest politics in this country in which politicians are dedicated to serving the 
public, not themselves.  We are introducing legislation to create an independent regulator for 
Parliamentary standards, and a tough, legally binding Code of Conduct for MPs.  Every claim made 
by MPs over the last four years will be audited: those who have broken the rules will be held to 
                                                
1 Unknown.  “Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill 2008-09 to 2009-10.”  www.parliament.uk.  Parliament 
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4 For the full text of the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, navigate to: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/13/contents  
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account.  But we need to go further in responding to the crisis of trust in the political system, opening 
up our constitution and Britain’s political institutions to reconnect citizens with our representative 
democracy.  The task of modernising the British constitutional settlement is not yet complete: we must 
be prepared to give power away, reforming Parliament and devolving and decentralising power even 
further throughout our country.”1 
 
 The legislation that resulted fit this description to a tee.  PSA created an independent 
body known as the ‘Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority’ (IPSA) to handle Commons 
finances, directed IPSA to create a Code of Conduct related to MPs financial interests, and 
created an officer called the ‘Commissioner for Parliamentary Investigations’ to investigate 
alleged misconduct.2 
Analyzing the Response  
 
 
 Cowley has suggested that the expenses scandal is an atypical example of a crisis 
situation and response with regard to the applicability of the Westminster model in dealing with 
problems in the American model.3  Unlike most crises, the expenses scandal was an internal 
issue (in contrast to events such as the worldwide economic meltdown in Fall, 2008).  Though 
there was external involvement, e.g. the three journalists’ efforts and Telegraph leaks, it was 
solely internal misconduct that caused the crisis.  For this reason, Cowley argues, the scandal led 
to an unusual existential crisis in Parliament, with MPs in crisis mode preoccupied with a frantic 
effort to find a solution before the House rose for Summer recess.  Precisely because this 
situation is atypical of a crisis, it provides a unique opportunity to analyze the Westminster 
model and the way that it deals legislatively with crises.  It presents a raw perspective, as MPs 
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had no previous experiences to condition their responses, and reveals how Parliament acts when 
it is not sure what to do.   
In an analysis of Parliament’s response to the expenses scandal, there are several 
questions that should be asked.  The first concerns speed.  Second, did the scandal expose a need 
for the reforms covered by CRAG and PSA?  Third, did the reforms put in place by CRAG and 
PSA actually signify major policy departure or ideological shifts in the nature of parliamentary 
governance vis-à-vis the Westminster model and its Constitution?  Fourth, what can be said 
overall about the appropriateness of the response politically, given the speed with which the 
legislation was pushed to Royal Assent? 
 
Speed 
 
 
Considering the turnaround time from the first Telegraph leaks in early May, 2009 to 
Royal Assent of PSA on July 21st, 2009, the response was rushed.1  Introducing the bill to 
committee as the First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means, Rt. Hon. Sylvia Heal MP 
referenced “the speed with which the House is being asked to proceed with this bill.”2  This 
speed was objected to by the Tories throughout committee debate.  As an expert on 
Parliamentary voting patterns, Cowley asserts that most MPs remain loyal to the party label and 
obey their whips at division.  Thus, a partisan divide was clearly present.  Objection ranged from 
respectful disagreement to diatribe.  John Redwood (Con.), MP for Wokingham, “strongly 
object[ed] to the time limit on the Bill.”3  Sir Patrick Cormack (Con.), MP for South 
                                                
1 Put aside CRAG for the moment, as PSA was the direct response. 
2 House of Commons Hansard,  30 June 2009. 
3 House of Commons Hansard,  30 June 2009. 
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Staffordshire, at first voiced his displeasure over “the serious nature of the Government taking a 
Bill of constitutional significance through the House at a gallop and without time to consider and 
reflect.”1  His tone later took a dramatically negative turn: “we are here today because of the 
Prime Minister, who, in a fit of pique and panic, has introduced an extremely bad Bill to 
Parliament… This very bad bill has been foisted on us by the Prime Minister in a spirit of 
vindictiveness, malice and uncharitableness.  He is a Prime Minister who wishes to tear down 
some of the institutions of this country.”2 
When the bill moved to the Lords, speed caused similarly opinionated responses (though 
obviously less venomous).  Keep in mind that PSA’s remedies would not affect the Lords.  Rt. 
Hon. the Baroness Royall, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Leader of the House of 
Lords, opened the second reading of the Bill on July 8th, 2009 by making this point clear: 
“nothing in this Bill will affect this House.  Nothing in this Bill will impact upon this House.  
Nothing in this Bill will change what we in this House do and how we in this House do it.”3  
Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market (Con.) puts opposition to the Bill quite eloquently: 
“the handling of this matter is little short of disgraceful.  It bears all the hallmarks of a knee-jerk 
response by a beleaguered Prime Minister in a bunker making legislation on the hoof in response to 
newspaper headlines and announcing his quick thought for the day on YouTube.  It flies in the face of 
all the Government’s own rules for public consultation—I stress public consultation, as distinct from 
secret cross-party talks—and adequate time for scrutiny of legislation.  It raises serious constitutional 
issues as a result of the thoughtless haste with which the Government did the drafting.  We see 
evidence of that in the continuing response by the Government in making changes and even promising 
some—if I heard it right—in the next Parliament.”4 
 
Even Labour Peers were not unanimously on board with rubber-stamping PSA.  Lord Peston 
(Lab) suggested that “all the problems can be solved by a simple statement from my noble friend 
the Leader of the House [Baroness Royall].  All she has to do is to say that there will be no 
                                                
1 House of Commons Hansard, 30 June 2009. 
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accelerated timetable, and then the Government will have their legislation in October.  That is all 
she has to do.”1 
 Rushing reform was also problematic from a procedural standpoint.  Cowley rightly 
points out that debate over the two bills differed from discussions on other issues because of the 
subject matter involved.  When parliamentary debates occur on any range of topics, e.g. 
healthcare, economics, or education, only a certain number of MPs and Lords will be well versed 
on the subject.2  Though many others without such expertise may involve themselves in the 
conversation from a political or policy standpoint, they would not be experts in the matter and 
would be expected to defer to the experts in debate.  However, with regard to expenses and 
parliamentary procedure, every MP should be well versed.  As such, MPs were clearly interested 
in speaking their minds; Chairman Heal had to ask for a “measure of restraint” in the time and 
scope of MPs speeches so that as much as possible could be discussed in the allotted time.3  The 
stifling of debate certainly ruffled many feathers, making the brevity of scrutiny over the bill all 
the more noticeable. 
 It has been made clear that the response was rushed.  Before passing judgment on the 
negative implications of the rushed effort, the other questions will be first addressed.  Speed will 
therefore be discussed again shortly. 
 
                                                
1 House of Lords Hansard, 8 July 2009. 
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3 House of Commons Hansard, 30 June 2009. 
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Did the Scandal Expose a Need for Reform? 
 
 
 
 As the recent Middle East political crises have exposed, a government can only be 
effective if it commands the respect of its citizens.  That is not to say that the public has to like 
the job the government does or like its public servants; there will certainly be many in any 
democracy who disapprove of the job the government does.  Nevertheless, whether it is labeled 
appreciation, respect, or reverence, Americans and Britons by and large accept the necessity of a 
government, and are willing to abide living under democratic rule. 
 The expenses scandal had the potential to seriously undermine the public’s respect for its 
government and willingness to be governed by its elected officials.  Action needed to be taken, 
and CRAG and PSA were the solutions.  Recalling the provisions of CRAG abovementioned, 
only two were even remotely related to the expenses scandal.  The question is whether the 
scandal exposed deeper and broader issues, thus requiring the wide-ranging reforms proffered by 
CRAG.  Ruth Fox of the Hansard Society argues that “many politicians and commentators alike 
concluded that a link could be drawn between the visible affliction of the expenses debacle and 
the deep-rooted political infirmities that manifested themselves in other areas of our 
democracy.”1 
Lord Norton disagrees with those cited by Fox.  He believes that CRAG and the issues it 
attempted to resolve were not salient outside of Parliament.2  Previously mentioned Ipsos MORI 
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2 Professor the Lord Norton of Louth.  Personal Interview.  3 Feb. 2011. 
 38 
polling regarding public disinterest in constitutional reform confirms Norton’s point of view.  
Even further, he sees the effort by Labour to push CRAG through as an attempt to mitigate 
public anger towards a Labour government by deflecting blame away from MPs and towards 
structural issues (reminiscent of the Sundquist, Samuels and Shugart arguments).  Did the public 
agree with this assessment?  Hansard Society polling shows that in 2008 “‘only 19% of the 
public thought Parliament was ‘working for them.’”1  A survey from 2007 “found that only 34% 
of the UK public trusted Parliament.”2  Hansard Society focus group research from 2005 “found 
that politics was viewed by the public as ‘the pursuit of an exclusive and disreputable elite of 
hypocrites and liars.’”3 
There are two ways to interpret this polling data.  On the one hand, one could read these 
numbers to suggest that the public had been overwhelmingly disillusioned with politics for a 
long time.  Within that framework, it would be reasonable to suggest that the scandal brought 
that disillusionment to a critical mass, turning unhappiness into a demand for action.  On the 
other hand, the numbers could be read to suggest that the expenses scandal did not reveal 
anything new. 
If the scandal did reveal a degree of latent discontent with Parliament, the remedy did not 
match the ailment.  University College, London’s Constitution Unit perhaps stated this 
disconnect most boldly in its Monitor newsletter when referring to Brown’s efforts to use the 
scandal to push CRAG-type reforms: “the bad judgment came in over-reacting to the scandal, 
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promising wide ranging reforms which have nothing to do with the original mischief, and which 
have limited hope of being delivered in the remainder of this Parliament.”1  In fact CRAG did 
pass, achieving Royal Assent on April 8th, 2010, over a month before the election that would 
send David Cameron to Downing St.  Professor Cowley aptly describes the reform effort as akin 
to hanging ornaments on a Christmas tree.2  The situation was so bad for Labour that they had to 
be seen doing anything and everything they could; if the government could make the argument 
that a particular reform would in some way deal with the issues at hand (at best) or even that it 
would simply aid governance in some way, that reform could be hung on the tree.  This is 
evidenced by the “inchoate range of options” discussed post-scandal to remedy the situation: 
“everything from House of Commons business committee and select committee reform, to a bill 
of rights and a written constitution, from electoral reform and an elected second chamber, to 
reduction in the voting age and a smaller House of Commons” was proposed.3  By throwing 
everything up against the wall, the government hoped at least something would stick. 
If what was discussed and ultimately put forward by CRAG seemed to have little to do 
with the issues revealed by the expenses scandal, then how could the scandal have exposed a 
need for constitutional reform?  CRAG’s irrelevance to the scandal would lend credence to the 
argument that the response was born out of a political and electoral desire to contain the damage 
as much as possible before an upcoming election.  Politics is about winning elections, and an 
expenses scandal in the wake of an economic meltdown was likely to be the nail in the coffin for 
New Labour.  What’s more, even though Brown was always more interested in constitutional 
reform than Blair, Professor Cowley points out that Brown was not as dedicated to constitutional 
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reform post-expenses scandal as he had been previously, making it more difficult to enforce a top 
down push of the legislation through Parliament. 
However, CRAG was never intended to stand on its own as the sole response to the 
scandal.  Where CRAG faced difficulties of salience, PSA could be easily understood: it aimed 
to revamp the processes by which MPs claimed expenses and by which those expenses were 
vetted.  Did the expenses scandal expose a need for the reform provided by PSA?  A preliminary 
question is in order: did the shift from self-regulation to independent oversight mark a significant 
policy departure for the British government?  On the one hand, recall Hugh Tomlinson’s 
argument that Westminster had long operated in an environment of self-regulation.  To take that 
power away from Parliament and put it in the hands of a semi-independent bureaucracy is, in his 
opinion, a major constitutional shift for the UK (keep in mind that the term constitutional is used 
more vaguely when applied to the UK, as the British government operates under a constitution 
that is decentralized and based on legal precedent).1 
There is, however, an opposing argument to consider.  Self-regulation works as long as 
those entrusted with said responsibility do not abuse it.  The system of expense and finance 
regulation had broken down long before PSA was enacted.  While it may present a major policy 
departure on paper, PSA shifts merely to providing the watchdog required by the misconduct.  It 
cannot be viewed as a major departure in contrast to self-regulation because Parliament had 
disposed of self-regulation long before 2009. 
While Tomlinson looks at PSA from an ideological point of view, Lord Norton takes a 
more pragmatic stance.  He questions what will truly change under IPSA control.2  For him, 
IPSA is merely another government body investigating MPs’ finances; nothing about what is 
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claimed or how it is claimed changes.  Of course independent regulation would serve as a barrier 
to dishonest expense claims by providing another layer of scrutiny that MPs will not want to 
challenge.  On the other hand, are MPs who claim for glittery toilet seats and £1,000 television 
sets really going to change their behavior because there is a different person looking over their 
finances, or are they simply going to find another way around the new obstacle?  PSA might not 
change very much.  Perhaps this was intentional: Parliament gives up some independence to 
provide something tangible to showcase to constituents. 
Back then to the question of whether the expenses scandal exposed a need for the kind of 
reform provided by PSA.  The answer to this question depends on whether you agree with 
Tomlinson or Norton.  It seems clear that while Tomlinson certainly makes an interesting point, 
the fact that the Commons itself instigated ideological change by ceasing to care about its own 
rules created an environment where regulation was necessary.  Thus, IPSA merely put a body in 
place to support the environment that the Commons demonstrated it needed to deal appropriately 
with the money it doles out to MPs. 
 
Speed Redux 
 
 
 In light of the fact that the reforms put in place by CRAG were in large part tangential to 
the expenses scandal and that PSA did not change much of anything, was the speed with which 
the government attempted to push these reforms through appropriate?  Additionally, was it 
appropriate that the government attempted to suggest to the public that the remedies offered in 
CRAG and PSA were immediately necessary? 
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 Among all of the testimony presented, there is no dearth of evidence suggesting that the 
response was rushed.  Tomlinson, Lord Norton, and Cowley all agree.  Not only do they believe 
the response was rushed, but also that the response was inappropriate.  Tomlinson stated that the 
expenses scandal exposed an “inability to react sensibly to popular fuming.”1  As 
aforementioned, Cowley posits that there was no proper discussion of how to remedy the 
situation because MPs were running around in crisis mode, with which Lord Norton agreed 
given his previously cited testimony from Lords debate. 
 The rush and inappropriateness of the response suggests that it was both political and 
electoral.  It was political in that the expenses scandal was used as a way to kick CRAG into 
motion.  The scandal provided a unique opportunity to make the case to both the public and the 
media that these kinds of reforms were not just salutary, but necessary with regard to the 
shortcomings in the British system of governance exposed by the expenses scandal.  The 
opportunity would not, however, be properly exploited: as aptly stated by the Hansard Society, 
“in prescribing such a wide variety of reform remedies—many of which will simply not be 
realised, at least in the short and medium term, due to a lack of policy consensus, political capital 
and legislative time—the party leaders risk making the cure worse than the disease.”2 
 In light of the impending election set to happen anytime before the end of May, 2010—
and which Brown understandably put off as long as possible—the response was also electoral.  
Labour had to do whatever possible to avoid being brutally demolished at the ballot box.  
Ultimately, the result turned out not to be as bad as it could have been: though Cameron did 
move into No. 10, he fell short of an outright majority, and Nick Clegg and the Liberal 
Democrats crashed and burned in a matter of weeks in the run-up to the election, despite talk 
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during the campaign of a potential outright Lib Dem majority.  In retrospect it then becomes 
tempting to retort that while the response to the expenses scandal may have been politically and 
electorally engineered by Labour leadership, their response worked!  This paper is not concerned 
with the partisan implications of the outcome.  As a matter of public policy, the focus is on the 
appropriateness and the level of partisan politicization involved in the legislative process and the 
potential effect on policy when legislation can be pushed through. 
 CRAG and PSA did not restore levels of public confidence in Parliament.  Ipsos MORI 
polling shows that levels of public dissatisfaction with government (outside of the obvious spike 
in the summer of 2009 when dissatisfaction climbed to around 80%) was both pre- and post-
expenses scandal at around 2/3 of those polled.1  That figure is generally consistent with 
dissatisfaction ratings dating back to 2003.2  Looking at CRAG and PSA from a policy 
perspective, with the legislation supposedly intending to deal with broader flaws in the 
Westminster model and a breakdown of public confidence in government, the government’s 
response did not work; public opinion regarding dissatisfaction with Parliament did not shift.  
A perennial question in Political Science is whether the general public should be 
considered politically knowledgeable.  If so, where are they getting their information and cues?  
Following the expenses scandal, the government received so much negative publicity that it 
would arguably have been more difficult for members of the general public to stay out of the 
know than in.  If they read newspapers, watched television, or browsed the Internet, they heard 
about pervasive dishonesty in Westminster and a botched response.  Researching the issue, I 
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have always wondered whether a political and electoral response to the crisis was doomed from 
the start by being appreciated as just that.  Instead, perhaps the government would have been 
better off to respond publicly by saying that it understood the situation was bad and there was a 
breakdown in accountability and public trust in Parliament, but that it was not going to rush a 
response.  If the government had acknowledged that there was an upcoming election yet stated 
that it would not try to fit a response in an electoral timeframe, instead opting to appropriately 
consider the necessary response to the situation, perhaps the public would have responded to the 
honesty.  By putting the public above its interest in being re-elected, Labour might have 
ultimately been rewarded. 
 Professor Cowley responds that this was not a viable option.  He hypothesizes that the 
media and opposition parties would have crucified Labour for its inaction.  Nevertheless, 
opposition politicians disapproved of the rushed legislative effort and wished instead to see more 
time made available for proper discussion.  If the more upfront and honest route I have suggested 
had been taken, it would have allowed Labour to proclaim publicly that it wanted to pursue a 
bipartisan response.  The Tories and Lib Dems could not have turned down a public offer; if they 
did, Labour could have responded that its opponents were not interested in participating to fix the 
problem.  Working together would have gone a long way to neutralize the issue as an election 
hot topic and insulated Labour from total responsibility for the situation. 
  
 
Summary 
 
 
Though the ramifications of the expenses scandal aftermath on the argument for adoption 
of a parliamentary system in the U.S. will later be discussed in detail, what should be said at this 
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point about the expenses scandal?  Parliament can move quickly, and in this situation did.  The 
detail of the story suggests that speed was not useful in this situation.  Labour leadership became 
so wrapped up in trying to deal with the situation in an electoral timeframe and out of 
consideration for party politics that they seem not to have stopped to consider whether the 
agenda they were pushing through was appropriate.  Appropriateness refers both to whether the 
reforms properly dealt with the flaws in Westminster, and whether the reforms and the speed 
with which they were passed were, from a policy perspective, in the best interest of the nation.   
The ability to act quickly may appear beneficial at first glance.  Without detailed 
knowledge of the response, one might reasonably believe that the government’s ability to bring 
its agenda to bear on the British people without being derailed by opposition parties should have 
allowed the government to focus on the policy free from partisan and electoral influence.  From a 
partisan and electoral standpoint the solution arguably worked—Labour could have fared much 
worse in the election.  But this serves as evidence that a parliamentary model of democracy does 
not necessarily occupy the moral high ground vis-à-vis the American Federal system. 
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The Budget Crisis 
 
 
 In the Fall of 2008, the world faced an economic meltdown spurred by U.S. economic 
troubles.  The UK was certainly not immune, and found itself with a budget deficit of £160bn.  
Compounding the situation, the economy had been sluggish even before global downturn: by the 
second quarter of 2008, growth moved into negative territory, becoming worst in Q4 2008 and 
Q1 2009.1  On November 3rd, 2008, the European Commission released forecasts for 2009 in 
which it indicated that the British economy would contract by 1% while the Eurozone (those 
countries of the European Union that use the Euro currency) would avoid recession.  Growth 
would ultimately move back into positive territory in Q4 2009.  In response to the meltdown, 
Chancellor Darling announced a stimulus agenda, increasing government borrowing to prop up 
the economy—specifically prioritizing housing, energy, and small business.2  The Chancellor 
planned to pump a £20bn stimulus into the economy between December, 2008, and April, 2010, 
and reduced VAT from 17.5% to 15% from December 1st, 2008 through the end of 2009.  
Additionally, tax breaks were targeted to help those on “modest, low, and middle incomes.”3 
The crisis would precede the expenses scandal, but was another example of the financial 
woes that hit during a Labour-led government.  This is not to suggest that Labour caused the 
financial meltdown in the UK or globally, but later evidence will suggest that Labour policies 
and actions may have exacerbated the negative consequences that the crisis would have on the 
                                                
1 Blanchflower, David.  “Welcome back to 1930s Britain.”  New Statesman 1 Nov. 2010.  Page 19.  Print. 
2 Hennessy, Patrick & Mark Kleinman.  “Financial crisis: Alistair Darling will spend his way out of recession.”  
www.telegraph.co.uk.  The Telegraph, 18 Oct. 2008.  Web.  1 March 2011.  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/3224890/Financial-crisis-Alistair-Darling-will-spend-his-way-
out-of-recession.html>. 
3 House of Commons Hansard, 24 Nov. 2008. 
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British public.  As far as the public is concerned, they expect government to deal with these 
issues and, therefore, they fault whoever is in charge at the time when things do not go well.  In 
the U.S., the meltdown solidified anger against the Republican Party and increased support for 
presidential hopeful Barack Obama.  Obama’s lead was aided by the fact that John McCain did 
not appear extremely knowledgeable on economic issues. 
Similar issues existed in British politics.  Following the Coalition takeover the 
government wanted to distance itself from the big government, high spending environment of the 
previous Labour government.  In doing so it hoped to excuse itself from responsibility for the 
state of the UK’s economy, portraying itself as responsible not for the mess but for the cleanup 
effort. 
 Even in the absence of a financial crisis, Conservative and Labour economic perspectives 
differ dramatically.  Add to that a massive budget deficit, and the conversation gets significantly 
more heated.  Despite the fact that “the figures show that Alistair Darling’s strategy was working 
well,” the Coalition shifted gears upon taking power in order to pursue a more aggressive 
approach.1  Though the Tories and Lib Dems joined forces to create a government after neither 
could win an outright majority, the Tories (as the significantly larger party) are the true driving 
force behind the Coalition agenda.  In October, 2010, Coalition Chancellor Rt. Hon. George 
Osborne MP put out the Spending Review 2010 (Cm.7942), where he laid out the Coalition plan 
to reduce the deficit and set the British economy back on track.  The Review, in addition to using 
general Coalition rhetoric, accepts that the necessary cuts will certainly be difficult and will sting 
for many, but that they are nonetheless necessary; the alternative would be the British Isles 
sinking into the North Sea.  Osborne highlights that in “2009 Britain’s deficit was the largest in 
                                                
1 Blanchflower, David.  “Welcome back to 1930s Britain.”  New Statesman 1 Nov. 2010.  Page 19.  Print. 
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its peacetime history—the state borrowed one pound for every four it spent.”1  To deal with the 
deficit the government cut departmental budgets of public spending “other than health and 
overseas aid…by an average of 19 per cent over four years.”2  In addition to the cuts, part of the 
long-term austerity plan entailed devolving power away from Westminster to localities, 
increasing the VAT from 17.5% to 20%, and encouraging the stimulation of the private sector to 
recoup losses in the public sector. 
 The argument does not stop there.  Jumping on the bandwagon with the public (or 
perhaps partly responsible for creating that bandwagon), the Coalition placed blame for the 
situation and the necessity of the cuts squarely on Labour’s shoulders.  As the back and forth 
between the parties degenerated into childish arguments of ‘yes you did, ‘no we didn’t,’ it 
became increasingly difficult to have a mature discussion over the issue at hand and how to solve 
it.  Ask five politicians whether Labour was to blame for the economic and budget crisis and you 
will get seven answers.  Ask five politicians anything and you will get seven answers.  To avoid 
this paper being drawn into such gibing, it is perhaps best to turn to an analysis that appears 
even-handed if not correct.  The New Statesman puts forth:  
“few doubt that the country’s £155bn Budget deficit must be addressed urgently and that Labour 
cannot and should not evade responsibility for the depth of the crisis.  But there is room for reasonable 
disagreement about the pace and severity of fiscal retrenchment and about the balance of tax rises to 
spending cuts.  The coalition’s refusal to recognise any alternative course and its dismissal of its 
critics as ‘deficit deniers’ is intellectually dishonest.”3 
 
What has been involved in urgently addressing the deficit and refusing to recognize alternative 
courses of action? 
                                                
1 Rt. Hon. George Osborne MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer.  “Cm.7942: Spending Review 2010.”  www.official-
documents.gov.uk.  TSO: Information and Publishing Solutions, October 2010.  Web.  1 March 2011.  
<www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm79/7942/7942.pdf>. 
2 Rt. Hon. George Osborne MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer.  “Cm.7942: Spending Review 2010.”  www.official-
documents.gov.uk.  TSO: Information and Publishing Solutions, October 2010.  Web.  1 March 2011.  
<www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm79/7942/7942.pdf>. 
3 Unknown.  “Feel the pain as Osborne swings his axe.”  New Statesman 25 Oct. 2010.  Page 5.  Print. 
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Regional, Sectoral, and Class Impact 
 
 
 How hard hitting are the reforms?  Is there any rhyme or reason to who feels the brunt of 
the cuts? According PriceWaterhouseCooper’s Nick Jones and John Hawksworth, “total 
discretionary consolidation is forecast to be approximately £113 bn p.a. by 2014-15 (around 
6.3% of GDP in that year), of which around £84 bn p.a. (73%) comes from spending reduction 
and £29 bn p.a. (27%) from net tax increases, the latter being more heavily front loaded over the 
five year period.”1  Based on these figures and those from the Office for Budget Responsibility 
(OBR), Jones and Hawksworth expect a loss of 500,000 public sector jobs.2  Combined with 
expected private sector losses of around 450,000 during that period, the government will have 
been responsible for putting one million people out of work.  The Coalition will of course 
dispute that, saying that Labour caused the losses.  Placing blame for Britain’s economic climate 
and its impact on the labor force is not within the purview of this work; assessing the legislative 
response is the objective.  The fact that there is such dispute and blame throwing between the 
parties is significant in what it says about the relative ease of legislating in the UK compared to 
the U.S.  More on this to come later.    
If the Coalition is attempting to be even-handed in how the effects of the austerity plan 
will be distributed, they are not doing a very good job of it.  PwC finds heavy regional and 
sectoral disparity with regard to where those losses will be found.   Regionally, Northern Ireland, 
                                                
1 Hawksworth, John & Nick C Jones.  “Sectoral and regional impact of the fiscal squeeze.”  
www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com.  PricewaterhouseCoopers, 12 Oct. 2010.  Web.  1 March 2011.  
<http://www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com/Media-Library/Sectoral-and-regional-impact-of-the-fiscal-squeeze-Full-
report-70a.aspx>. 
2 Hawksworth, John & Nick C Jones.  “Sectoral and regional impact of the fiscal squeeze.”  
www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com.  PricewaterhouseCoopers, 12 Oct. 2010.  Web.  1 March 2011.  
<http://www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com/Media-Library/Sectoral-and-regional-impact-of-the-fiscal-squeeze-Full-
report-70a.aspx>. 
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Scotland, Wales, and Northeast England will fare the worst by far.1  Sectoral analysis shows that 
social work, public administration, and defense—all of which are heavily publicly funded—will 
take the biggest hits, with more detailed loss predictions showing that office machinery, 
computers, and weapons and ammunition will see the biggest loss as a percent of sector gross 
output.2   To make matters worse, though part of the government’s long-term plan is to devolve 
power away from Westminster to localities, a report by the Centre for Cities from January 24th, 
2011 argues that struggling localities will “need extra support from central government.”3  The 
end result is that by increasing autonomy to localities, they will depend on Westminster further.  
For Parliament, the financial implications of outsourcing power to localities yet nevertheless 
increasing support for those localities may be greater than they would have been if Parliament 
had held onto power.  While devolution of power will be ideologically in step for the Tories, 
such a power shift would have been easier once stability has returned to the British economy. 
 There is also evidence for socioeconomic and income class disparity of distribution.  The 
VAT increase to 20% will have a greatest impact on those for whom expenditure is highest 
relative to income—the poorest.4  James Browne of the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) cites 
that the poorest income decile will see a loss of 2.5% as a proportion of income from the VAT 
                                                
1 Hawksworth, John & Nick C Jones.  “Sectoral and regional impact of the fiscal squeeze.”  
www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com.  PricewaterhouseCoopers, 12 Oct. 2010.  Web.  1 March 2011.  
<http://www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com/Media-Library/Sectoral-and-regional-impact-of-the-fiscal-squeeze-Full-
report-70a.aspx>. 
2 Hawksworth, John & Nick C Jones.  “Sectoral and regional impact of the fiscal squeeze.”  
www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com.  PricewaterhouseCoopers, 12 Oct. 2010.  Web.  1 March 2011.  
<http://www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com/Media-Library/Sectoral-and-regional-impact-of-the-fiscal-squeeze-Full-
report-70a.aspx>. 
3 Groom, Brian.  “Growth cities face severe test as cuts kick in.”  Financial Times 24 January 2011: National news 
page 4.  Print. 
4 Browne, James.  “Personal taxes and distributional impact of budget measures.”  www.ifs.org.uk.  The Institute for 
Fiscal Studies, June 2010.  Web.  1 March 2011.  Access to the document has been removed. 
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hike.1  Beyond tax rises, cuts to governmental departments—reducing the support they can 
provide—will hit hardest those who rely on public support.   
In contrast to the U.S., in Europe there is a rich post-WWII era history of the welfare 
state.  Citizens of many European countries expect certain services to be provided to them by the 
government, e.g. healthcare.  This is the case both in the UK and in countries like France.  It is 
important to keep in mind that the government will be reducing the efficacy of programs on 
which Britons have come to rely, e.g. the NHS.  The Los Angeles Times recounts the story of one 
British pensioner, Festus Grant, a retired subway driver.  Grant suffered a debilitating stroke in 
early 2010, spending three months in the hospital.  Following his return home, support from the 
Stroke Association helped him tremendously.  They assigned him a social worker, whose routine 
visits helped to get him acclimated to his new lifestyle and assisted him with errands, marketing, 
and the like.  At the time of publication, support from the Stroke Association was set to be 
removed by the end of 2010.  Beyond the difficulties Grant would face without such help, he 
worried about a secondary threat if the government included his home as it considered “allowing 
some public housing rents to rise closer to market rates.”2  In response, Grant says that “‘if they 
take more from me… I won’t be able to survive.’”3 
What does it mean that expert analysis and stories of pensioners like Grant seem to be 
falling on deaf ears?  The government either has not or will not consider the unevenness of the 
consequences its plan will have on the British public.  Browne believes that this negligence is 
part of the problem.  When asked to assess the degree to which the government has considered 
his findings, he replied that they mostly brush them off or try to discredit them.  This is not an 
                                                
1 Browne, James.  “Personal taxes and distributional impact of budget measures.”  www.ifs.org.uk.  The Institute for 
Fiscal Studies, June 2010.  Web.  1 March 2011.  Access to the document has been removed. 
2 Chu, Henry.  “British tea and parsimony.”  The Los Angeles Times 26 Nov 2010: page A10-11.  Print. 
3 Chu, Henry.  “British tea and parsimony.”  The Los Angeles Times 26 Nov 2010: page A11.  Print. 
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isolated incident: he finds that Parliament tends to ignore independent findings that do not 
support the government’s agenda. 1  This is all the more ironic as the government appointed IFS 
Director Robert Chote to head up the OBR (an office created by the Coalition government).  
Why will the government not listen?  It is easy enough to blame Labour for having created the 
situation, but, moving forward, the Coalition cannot blame its own unwillingness to consider 
outside information on Labour.  The Coalition does not want to listen, perpetuating the feeling 
that it is all just politics to them.  Watch any PMQs between Cameron and Miliband; Labour 
repeatedly says the cuts are going “too far, too fast.”  Cameron responds by making a joke about 
Miliband’s leadership naïveté and points the finger back and says it is Labour’s fault that the 
Coalition has to take such a course of action.  But again and again this response sees Cameron 
avoid dealing with questions concerning the depth and speed of the cuts—all he has done is 
engineered an inflammatory sound bite for the 6 o’clock news.    
 By failing to listen and take outside perspectives into account, sound bites ignore the fact 
that many Britons like Festus Grant will not have the ability to weather the storm.  As far as 
Labour is concerned, the Coalition appears to be mistakenly taking this ability for granted.  
Whereas the government’s response to the expenses scandal exhibited timidity, its response to 
the financial crisis exhibits wild aggressiveness.  Let us look again to the speed with which this 
response has been implemented. 
Speed 
 
 
Speed operates here on two levels.  The first level references how quickly the 
government came up with its plan and implemented it, which is especially important given the 
                                                
1 Browne, James.  Personal Interview.  24 Jan. 2011. 
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controversial nature of the plan.  On the second level there is the question of how quickly the 
government aims to set the economy back on track, and how it strategizes for the short-, 
medium-, and long-terms. 
  
First Level 
 
Labour believes the austerity plan goes too far, too fast; the Coalition believes that 
Labour left it a situation in which emergency action was needed.  Lord Skidelsky (a former Tory 
Peer, now a Crossbencher) posits that “if a government is felt to have lost all control, if the size 
of the debt is so vast that it threatens immediate default, then a decisive change of policy can 
have a decisive effect.  Britain was hardly in this position last April [2010], despite all the efforts 
of Conservative spokesmen to play up the imminence of the danger facing the country under 
Labour rule.”1  He thinks the panic stirred up by politicians was engineered.  If one agrees with 
the New Statesman perspective that Chancellor Darling’s plan was working, then engineering 
through rhetoric seems all the more likely.  Consider again the distinction between this response 
and the most recent American one—the extension of the Bush tax cuts for all.  The U.S. faced a 
similarly dire economic crash.  Rhetoric has not been so concerned with Armageddon in the 
U.S., nor have the actions America has taken been so dramatic in the sense of having negative 
effects on Americans.  One could respond that this difference is explained by Congress’ having 
been led by the Democrats in both the House and Senate at the time of response (whereas the 
Conservatives are in charge in Britain and therefore less likely to respond with big government 
stimuli).  Do not forget, however, that the U.S. stimulus package that likely saved the country 
from an even bigger problem was a product of the Bush White House.     
                                                
1 Lord Skidelsky.  “When confidence is shattered.”  New Statesman 25 Oct. 2010: page 27.  Print. 
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James Browne targets a key distinction between the U.S. and UK that legitimizes the 
difference in response.  There is a sizable difference between the percent of foreign exchange 
reserves held in USD ($) vs. GBP (£), 62.2% to 4.3% in 2009, respectively, rendering the dollar 
more stable than the pound.1  There was therefore a realistic concern that if the UK did not deal 
with the situation in due haste, it might not be able to finance its debt and could have become the 
next Greece.2  That may have been the case in October, 2008, but again attention should be 
pointed to Darling’s plan supposedly working before Osborne moved to No. 11.  Even in 
October, 2008 the situation may not have been as dire as Tories like to portray it: David 
Blanchflower writes for the New Statesman that “according to the Chancellor, George Osborne, 
the country had run out of money and was close to bankruptcy, and the cuts of over £80bn were 
fair.  This was all spin.  We were never close to bankruptcy; the country has not run out of 
money and the cuts are unfair.”3 
Clearly, the speed of the recovery was not absolutely necessary (at least based on 
testimony that does not unanimously suggest it was).  If the Coalition was able to convince the 
public that the speed was necessary to stave off impending doom, then it makes sense that they 
did not have time to consider outside analysis and those in positions similar to Festus Grant: the 
situation needed to be dealt with immediately, and the government had already done its analysis 
and decided its plan was in the best interest of the country.  If the situation was not in reality as 
bad as the Coalition made it seem, a fuller discussion could at the very least have given 
Parliament more time to analyze the situation and consider the short- and long-term implications 
of the austerity plan ultimately enacted.   
                                                
1 Unknown.  “Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER).”  www.imf.org.  IMF: 
International Monetary Fund, n.d.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cofer/eng/cofer.pdf>. 
2 Browne, James.  Personal Interview.  24 Jan. 2011. 
3 Blanchflower, David.  “Welcome back to 1930s Britain.”  New Statesman 1 Nov. 2010: page 19.  Print. 
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Second Level 
 
What can be said of the speed with which the budget cuts and tax increases would hit as 
part of the Coalition effort to fast track the recovery process?  Browne notes that the respective 
Labour and Tory plans and rhetoric for recovery are not all that different; the biggest distinction 
between them is not over what they would change to reduce the deficit but over the pace of their 
plans.  Troublesome for the Coalition’s more aggressive timeline is what Nick Jones has 
commented as the “lack of concrete planning at the time of the [2010] Spending Review 
announcement on how to effect transition in the short-term and the implications for rebalancing 
the economy sectorally and regionally.”1  If the austerity plan is successful, regained stability 
will not be realized for some time.  This seems a risky political move for the coalition.  Whereas 
staggering of elections in the U.S. prevents tides from sweeping out a political incumbency as 
Hugh Tomlinson hypothesized could have happened post-expenses scandal, British politics has 
no such insulation.  If the time horizon for the Coalition plan is more than five years, it risks 
being kicked out for failing to deliver on its promises by the next election. 
  Tory and Lib Dem control is even more precarious in light of the great deal of 
controversy surrounding their fiscal plans.  A majority of the British public is to be found in 
middle- and low-income classes and is most vulnerable to the impact of the austerity plan.  These 
people are actively being pushed away from the Conservative and Lib Dem parties; if things 
have not gotten better for them by 2015 it would not be unreasonable to expect them to reflect 
their discontent at the ballot box.  This is especially true for the Lib Dems: Tony Benn warns that 
                                                
1 Jones, Nick.  Personal Interview.  19 Jan. 2011. 
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coalitions are always more damaging to the more progressive of the two parties. 1  Couple this 
with the fact that the Lib Dems have reneged on significant (and easy to comprehend) campaign 
platform promises, e.g. not raising student tuition fees, and their footing may be highly unstable.  
Consequently, Will Straw of the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) believes the 
government is making a “strategic mistake,” and expects that “the coalition [sic] will take a hit at 
each subsequent set of local elections (which take place every May) as well as in the Welsh and 
Scottish elections in May 2011 and the European elections in May 2014.”2 
The fact that these considerations have not been the first priority for the government 
supports the Coalition argument that their plan is not politically motivated.  Certainly the 
Coalition is doing what it truly feels is right, and does not want Labour or outside opinion to 
undermine its mandate to rule and handle the crisis.  Neil O’Brien of Policy Exchange agrees.  
He asserts that precisely because the government can pass what it likes through Parliament, it 
would be easy enough for it to pass a cut package that leaves poor people (who are less likely to 
vote) to fend for themselves while simultaneously beefing up electoral support by enacting 
electoral reform to help ensure future election wins.3  He believes one could look to any number 
of examples where the executive used the legislature and parliamentary procedure to win seats 
(e.g. cutting funding to hospitals in safe opposition constituencies rather than in contested ones).  
Jon Cruddas believes that, on the contrary, the Coalition is doing exactly what O’Brien 
says it is not, using political procedure to disenfranchise the poor and secure its continued 
electoral success.  He sees the austerity plan as consciously intending to dismantle safety nets for 
the poor as part of an overall Tory effort to redefine electoral politics.  By systematically 
                                                
1 Benn, Tony.  Personal Interview.  27 Jan. 2011. 
2 Straw, Will.  Personal Interview.  15 Feb. 2011. 
3 O’Brien, Neil.  Personal Interview.  3 Feb. 2011. 
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targeting and disenfranchising Britain’s poorer citizens, eliminating and redistricting fifty 
Commons’ constituencies, standardizing the size of constituencies, and abandoning First Past 
the Post for AV, the Tories are using their legislative power to effect long-lasting changes to 
secure their governmental control and offset potential retrospective voting against the austerity 
plan in 2015 and beyond. 
If Cruddas is right in his appraisal of the situation, it would make sense that there is not a 
lot of room for bipartisan discussion on the matter.  The Coalition will push its fiscal agenda 
through to the dismay of Labour.  On the other hand, what if Cruddas is off base (certainly a 
possibility given that his opinion is fairly dramatic)?  What if, as O’Brien says, the Coalition is, 
and has gone to great lengths to be, even-handed in its distribution of austerity plan pain?  If the 
Coalition was truly interested in being even-handed, it would at least consider outside experts.  
Even if Labour is fully to blame for the fiscal crisis, there is a disconnect between wanting to do 
what is best for the country and the spiteful rhetoric that flies across the despatch boxes.  
 
   
Perception 
 
Despite what the Coalition, Opposition, and experts within and outside of Westminster 
are saying, does it really matter what the Coalition plan is?  How many members of the public 
keep up to date with statistically detailed reports from PwC or IFS’ PowerPoints?  Not likely 
very many.  However, most people watch television, and the media can digest the information 
and spit it out in laymen’s terms for the public.  Benn is confident that the most important factors 
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in motivating how a government is received are public and media opinion.1  The two are surely 
linked.  O’Brien points out that perception has the power to shape policy, a prime example being 
the Tory decision to replace Margaret Thatcher in 1990 in response to unpopular policies such as 
the Poll Tax to support local governments and dissent within her administration over views on 
integration of the UK into the European Community.2  
How, then, has public perception crystallized around the austerity plan?  Browne takes a 
pragmatic view, stating rather bluntly that “the Coalition will be unpopular in the next few years.  
They’ll have to show that they’ve got us through the whole crisis.”3  He is willing to give the 
Coalition the time to prove itself—or at least believes that they will have until the next election 
to do so.  Despite the thought that a majority of the public might rally against the Coalition, 
Economist polling from October 18th, 2010 shows that popular opinion “is not overwhelmingly 
negative... 60% of voters regard the cuts as unavoidable, and 48% blame Labour for them.  They 
also seem braced for the impact: 49% expect public services to get a little worse as a result of the 
cuts, and 35% expect them to get much worse.”4  Of course, there will be many demographics 
that do not share those ‘average’ opinions found by such polling.  Trade unions have held rallies 
against the plans, senior military officials are angry about the cutbacks forced upon them, and 
local governments are vocal against cuts to their budgets.5 
With public opinion varied, it would make sense that much of public and media 
perception depends on the extent to which a negative assessment of Coalition policy is 
successfully presented by Labour.  Perhaps this is why the parties have not worked together.  For 
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as much as it makes the Coalition’s job easier to blame its actions on past Labour missteps, it is 
in Labour’s interest to stand on the sidelines if the plan does not work (as it thinks it will not) to 
avoid blame and be ready to receive angry members of the public into the Labour party.  
Standing apart and refusing to cooperate with one another is crucially important for the parties: if 
the public is to take its cues from the media and decide with which point of view they agree, 
venomous bickering at sound bite levels will be most easily comprehended.  The back and forth 
across the despatch boxes and in the media of ‘we’re right, you’re wrong, stick with us!’ will 
thus continue to be the dominant form of inter-party rhetoric.  As the plan unfolds, however, Will 
Straw feels that shifting popular support may encourage the Coalition “to change course and 
adopt more of Labour’s policies.”1  
How has Labour fared?  Recent Ipsos MORI polling shows Labour as the most liked of 
the three major parties: 45% of respondents are pleased with Labour, compared to 37% and 40% 
for the Tories and Lib Dems, respectively.2  On leadership, however, the situation is reversed: 
the same poll ranked Ed Miliband least liked of the three party leaders, trailing Cameron’s 47% 
and Clegg’s 40% with 36%.3  Labour’s negative but ineffective response to the tripling of 
student tuition fees suggests that public response seems to be more in line with polling of the 
party leaders (where Ed Miliband is regarded least highly) than with polling of the parties 
themselves (where Labour is regarded most highly).  Clegg warned during the election campaign 
that there would be “‘Greek-style unrest’ if the Conservatives pushed through savage spending 
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Total Politics, 27 Jan. 2011.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.totalpolitics.com/blog/45443/labour-could-they-be-
further-ahead-with-.thtml>. 
3 Benson, Calum.  “Labour—‘Could they be further ahead with a better known leader?’”  www.totalpolitics.com.  
Total Politics, 27 Jan. 2011.  Web.  1 March 2011.  <http://www.totalpolitics.com/blog/45443/labour-could-they-be-
further-ahead-with-.thtml>. 
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cuts on the back of a slim electoral mandate.”1  This was a motivating factor in the youth support 
that the Lib Dems enjoyed during the campaign.  After the Lib Dems voted for the trebling, 
students justifiably felt betrayed, taking to the streets in a series of events ranging from protests 
to riots.  Many students have subsequently disowned the Lib Dems; they are not likely to be so 
keen on the Tories, either.  The New Statesman has described Labour’s inability to capitalize on 
the situation: “during his campaign for the Labour leadership, Ed Miliband spoke frequently of 
his desire to reach out to grass-roots activists and to lead a movement rather than a party.  “But 
since the protests began, Labour has missed countless opportunities to act as a receptacle for a 
new generation of activists.”2  Action could have resonated beyond students: “a YouGov poll 
published on 5 December [2010] showed that 49% of voters are opposed to the coalition’s tuition 
fees policy, with just 38% in favour.”3  If Labour cannot latch on to popular opinion against an 
unpopular Coalition policy that has received a heavy amount of press, the prospect for their 
rallying public support more generally is fairly grim. 
Even if Labour was doing a better job rallying the public, would its efforts really 
resonate?  Keep in mind that Labour’s credibility took a pounding in the summer of 2009.  It is 
possible that the public is not yet ready to accept Labour as the protector of the taxpayer’s wallet 
because the image of Labour’s hands in their wallets is so fresh in memory.  That Labour has 
polled most liked of the parties could simply signify expected higher public discontent with the 
in-power parties—the Tories and Lib Dems.  In discussion of the matter, Lord Norton posits that 
there is certainly carryover in public discontent with Parliament from the expenses scandal, 
                                                
1 Unknown.  “Labour cannot afford to be left behind by today’s protesters.”  New Statesman 13 Dec. 2010: page 5.  
Print. 
2 Unknown.  “Labour cannot afford to be left behind by today’s protesters.”  New Statesman 13 Dec. 2010: page 5.  
Print. 
3 Unknown.  “Labour cannot afford to be left behind by today’s protesters.”  New Statesman 13 Dec. 2010: page 5.  
Print. 
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compounded by budget cuts and tax increases.1  Thus, a large part of Labour’s ability to 
transform discontent with the Coalition into Labour support may depend on the extent to which, 
and for how long, any discontent remains targeted at Labour. 
 
Where the UK Stands Now 
 
 
Roger Bootle of The Telegraph is of the mind that it is simply too early to analyze 
whether or not Cameron, Osborne, and their team have handled the mess appropriately.2  At the 
time of this writing the majority of the budget cuts have not yet come into effect; with cuts 
scheduled to take effect in a matter of weeks following the recent March 23rd, 2011 budget, many 
are currently holding their tongues and keyboards.  Causing further anxiety is the fact that UK 
“GDP contracted by 0.6% in the final three months of last year [2010].”3  Osborne is fond of 
pointing out that the UK had an unusually nasty winter, with snow bringing the country to a halt 
for several days and negatively affecting the economy.4  When the cuts do come into effect, will 
they cause a rebound in the economy or a further contraction?  External factors such as 
instability in the Middle East and the ensuing effect on oil prices add to the uncertainty. 
Having released his new budget on March 23rd, 2011, not much seems to have changed in 
the Chancellor’s point of view.  This serves to further cement that the Coalition’s plan—both 
                                                
1 Professor the Lord Norton of Louth.  Personal Interview.  3 Feb. 2011. 
2 Bootle, Roger.  “Chancellor Osborne can cement his reputation if he avoids a double dip.”  www.telegraph.co.uk.  
The Telegraph, 13 March 2011.  Web.  15 March 2011.  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/rogerbootle/8379354/Chancellor-Osborne-can-cement-his-
reputation-if-he-avoids-a-double-dip.html>. 
3 Stewart, Heather & Andrew Clark.  “A budget for growth, chancellor?  Perhaps you could try this…”  
www.guardian.co.uk.  The Guardian: The Observer, 13 March 2011.  Web.  15 March 2011.  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/mar/13/budget-for-growth-chancellor-try-this>. 
4 To appreciate how bad the situation was, the drive from London to Suffolk (eastern England) for a weding in the 
middle of December following a major snowstorm took ten hours; the drive usually takes two. 
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good and bad—was not merely a rushed blip, but a long-term plan that will not change.  Shamik 
Das of Left Foot Forward (LFF) highlights that the new budget delivers “little cheer for students, 
the poor, those on low-to-middle incomes, people in a job, people without a job… basically 
everyone, save for big businesses who will benefit from the chancellor’s [sic] slashing of 
corporation tax—depriving the Treasury of £11.2bn over the next four years.”1  As the name 
implies, LFF carries a left-wing bias.  To validate its opinions, the Independent’s Johann Hari 
argues that “this was a budget that abandoned everything we have learned about economics since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s.  We discovered then that in a recession, consumers—quite 
rightly—cut their spending and save more.  But if the Government does the same thing at the 
same time then nobody is spending and the recession gets worse… John Maynard Keynes [is] 
spinning and howling in his grave.”2 
 
Summary 
 
In contrast to the expenses scandal, analysis of the austerity plan benefits neither from 
hindsight nor from being devoid of external influence.  In terms of the financial crisis, it is more 
difficult to analyze the plan and its potential long-term effects, as future external geopolitical and 
economic events will impact the British economy in ways that cannot be predicted.  From a 
purely policy and legislative perspective, however, the response to the crisis again highlights a 
less than ideal response from Westminster to address a crisis situation.  There are question marks 
regarding whether the austerity plan is the best course of action and whether the short-term hurt 
                                                
1 Das, Shamik.  “Look Left—Osborne fails to learn the lessons of history.”  www.leftfootforward.org.  Left Foot 
Forward, 25 March 2011.  Web.  25 March 2011.  <http://www.leftfootforward.org/2011/03/look-left-2-03-11/>. 
2 Das, Shamik.  “Look Left—Osborne fails to learn the lessons of history.”  www.leftfootforward.org.  Left Foot 
Forward, 25 March 2011.  Web.  25 March 2011.  <http://www.leftfootforward.org/2011/03/look-left-2-03-11/>. 
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will be fully offset if long-term planning pans out as the Coalition expects.  One thing is certain: 
in the face of uncertain and complicated economic conditions, considering opposing points of 
view (if not compromising on the plan) would have been beneficial.  The ramifications are 
simply too important to leverage an entire citizenry’s well-being on measures inspired by hubris.  
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Conclusion: Takeaway for the U.S. 
 
 “The handling of this matter is little short of disgraceful.  It bears all the hallmarks of a knee-jerk 
response by a beleaguered Prime Minister in a bunker making legislation on the hoof in response to 
newspaper headlines and announcing his quick thought for the day on YouTube.  It flies in the face of 
all the Government’s own rules for public consultation—I stress public consultation, as distinct from 
secret cross-party talks—and adequate time for scrutiny of legislation.  It raises serious constitutional 
issues as a result of the thoughtless haste with which the Government did the drafting.  We see 
evidence of that in the continuing response by the Government in making changes and even promising 
some—if I heard it right—in the next Parliament.”  
 
– Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market in House of Lords debate, July 8th, 2009 
 
 Though the above was spoken with regard to the expenses scandal, it could just as easily 
be discussing the response to the budget crisis.  It is of note because, among all the expert 
testimony presented within these pages, it is the most eloquent criticism of Westminster’s less 
than honorable handling of crisis situations.  Further, it serves as prime evidence as to why the 
U.S. would not necessarily be better off for having enacted parliamentary-style reforms. 
Tony Benn believes that in spite of structural governmental differences between the U.S. 
and the UK, the two systems are not all that different.  Pondering the disparities between the two 
nations, Lord Norton sees no reason why the U.S. could not operate under a parliamentary 
model;1 described by the UK’s Political Studies Association as the “‘greatest living expert on 
Parliament,’” and having spent time in the U.S.—where he received an M.A. degree from the 
University of Pennsylvania—his conclusion must be accepted as valid.2  The basis for 
comparison therefore exists to validate the potential described by Sundquist in the opening pages 
of this chronicle that the U.S. could, absent constitutional impediments, adopt reforms to see it 
                                                
1 Professor the Lord Norton of Louth.  Personal Interview.  3 Feb. 2011. 
2 Unknown.  “PSA Awards 2008.”  www.psa.ac.uk.  Political Studies Association, n.d.  Web.  1 March 2011.  
<http://www.psa.ac.uk/Content.aspx?ParentID=2&SearchID=1002008>. 
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operate more like a parliamentary system.  Having since described Parliament’s legislative 
response to two crises, the original question may now be posed once again: would the U.S. truly 
be better off if its government operated more like a Parliament? 
 A crucial point to keep in mind is that the question does not imply a binary response, 
though Sundquist, Samuels, and Shugart may believe it does.  It is not as simple as saying one 
system is right and the other is wrong, either holistically or at the facet level.  However, as if 
strolling down the lane of a supermarket and placing listed items in the basket, the authors pick 
and choose pieces of the parliamentary system from which they believe the U.S. would, from 
governmental and public policy angles, benefit.  By falsely assuming that the issues associated 
with governance in America are symptoms of structural rather than cultural deficiencies, they fail 
to notice the similar influence of partisan and electoral consideration that negatively impacts the 
legislative process and policy output in the UK.  That British politics likewise suffers from the 
same two of the biggest obstacles to providing good policy and governance, that those obstacles 
have become more problematic in recent history, and that those obstacles exist in both the U.S. 
and UK despite the structural differences that enable them, should evidence the fact that the 
underlying problems on both sides of the pond are more cultural than structural.  For Washington 
to nevertheless benefit from a closer structural resemblance to Westminster, America would have 
to find itself in a position where the pros and cons associated with a relative inability to progress 
and evolve are fundamentally outweighed by the pros and cons associated with the ability to act 
swiftly and decisively. 
 Do the British pros and cons outweigh the American ones?  As aforementioned, abuse of 
legislative procedure such as the filibuster (which is, ironically, constitutionally unprotected 
though many Senators embrace it with incredible fervor) and a loss of collegiality in Congress in 
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recent years suggest that we have indeed reached this point.  Would we be better off if our 
system of government did not enable status quo to a fault?  Most likely.  In that case, would the 
U.S. not benefit from at least getting something done?  This argument presupposes that flawed 
action is superior to inaction or delayed action.  As Whitehall’s responses to the expenses 
scandal and financial crisis demonstrate, this presupposition is false.  The expenses scandal was 
followed by an irrelevant (CRAG) and insignificant (PSA) response that revealed a degree of 
consideration for partisan and electoral ramifications and, as evidenced by polling, did not 
address the public’s discontent with Parliament.  The response to the financial crisis showcases a 
response that sacrificed expert analysis and balanced ideology in favor of continued vitriol from 
opposing benches.  In both situations a more thoughtful and ideologically balanced response 
would have been preferable. 
From the party perspective, while stagnation promotes discontent among members of 
Congress who are apt to blame the other party for their inability to legislate, swiftness and speed 
promote similarly venomous inter-party animosity in Britain and lead to a great deal of finger 
pointing.  Because of unified party control of the branches of government in the UK, it is easier 
to place blame on one identifiable entity (the party).  As finger pointing during expenses scandal 
and financial crisis responses demonstrates, a fine line is easily crossed in such a system where, 
among the brouhaha of “he said, she said” and “I’m right, you’re wrong,” everything gets 
wrapped up in these black and white portrayals of events.  David Cameron’s new year’s message 
at the end of 2008 while he was Leader of the Opposition (following the financial meltdown) 
provides a typical example: 
“That is how we will rebuild our broken economy and our broken society—business by business, 
family by family, community by community.  Not through imposing some kind of state blueprint from 
above, like Gordon Brown wants to do, but by allowing the talent and effort and incredible character 
of British people to shine.  That is the greatest source of hope we have.  That is why I’m optimistic 
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about our country’s future.  And that is why we need change now.”1 
 
For context, this paragraph was bookended by an opening paragraph referring to Emperor 
Hadrian of Rome who suggested that Rome would be rebuilt after a devastating fire brick by 
brick and a subsequent paragraph that goes into a diatribe against Labour.  Never mind the fact 
that a state blueprint with absolute notions of what must be done is exactly what Chancellor 
Osborne has put forward; so, what is Cameron actually saying here?  If the sophomoric 
paraphrasing may be pardoned—if only to highlight the paragraph with humor: ‘we’ll fix the 
British economy by caring about each person.  Labour is bad, they think they have all the 
answers.  Don’t forget what your mother told you—you are special!  Because you’re special, 
we’ll get out of this mess.  Because you’re special and that’s why we’ll get out of this mess, 
that’s why we need to ditch Labour.  Labour is evil.  Did I mention Labour is bad news?’   
This style works in a parliamentary system.  Not only do the two sides not have to get 
along, but if the opposition is going to be left out by controversial policies that they cannot stop, 
at least they can kick and scream and draw attention to themselves.  Is this really the kind of 
system with which America would be better off?  Are things not bad enough already with our 
state of politics that we should risk heightening partisan animosity? 
 By many yardsticks both U.S. and UK systems of government appear to have become 
morally bankrupt.  That is not to say that democracy does not work.  I am an optimist, and I 
remain confident that it only takes a new generation of politicians to break out of the system to 
fix it.  Perhaps the leaks in the boat will never be plugged, but they could be.  To all the 
pessimists sitting in the boat shaking their heads while it sinks and saying “I told you so,” I 
would retort that there are too many problems on this planet to make the fall of democracy a self-
                                                
1 Rt. Hon. David Cameron MP, Leader of the Opposition.  “Cameron: Labour’s debt crisis is the past.”  
www.politics.co.uk.  politics.co.uk, 30 Dec. 2008.  Web.  1 March, 2011.  <http://www.politics.co.uk/speakers-
corner/issue-of-the-day/cameron-labour-s-debt-crisis-the-past-$1257649$1257647.htm>.  
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fulfilling prophecy. 
 At the same time, I’m also a pragmatist.  Perhaps the final word is that despite all of the 
reasons why the U.S. would not necessarily be better off operating more like a parliament, 
pragmatism, backed by all of the evidence provided herein, should immediately tell us that 
parliamentary-style reforms are not worth our consideration.  Something needs to be done, and 
our efforts need to be focused where they can make a difference. 
America should not be wasting time with suggestions that do not help.  With a greater 
degree of resemblance to Westminster, all the U.S. will have done is replaced some familiar 
problems with unfamiliar ones.  Further, the argument towards deficiencies being structural in 
nature is, despite best intentions, counter-productive.  By ignoring cultural deficiencies or 
suggesting that they are not the true problem, politicians are not being held accountable for 
abusing powers that, while intended to protect the U.S., are in fact hurting it.  To say that the 
system is broken and should be replaced seems a cop-out. 
Lastly, the argument in favor of parliamentary reforms gets America nowhere.  The 
American federal system will not change, and should not—at least not to a parliamentary model.  
American Political Science, and all Americans, would benefit from experts spending less time 
searching for answers to why the state of political affairs is so bad and spending more time 
searching for plausible ways to improve the situation.  Instead of moving the goal posts, let us 
figure out how to work within the boundaries we have.  
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